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
The Complexity of Achieving Stability in Sirte, Libya

by

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The Complexity of Achieving Stability in Sirte, Libya

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Abstract

This paper conducts a stakeholder's analysis of Libya from the perspective of USAFRICOM. The paper then recommends preliminary steps toward stability and order in Sirte, based on the understanding gained through the use of a stakeholder's analysis. These recommendations are: execution of a demining mission; establishment of security through NATO trained Libyan police; establishment of a civil-military operations center (CMOC) with the Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli; and tribal engagement. These recommended steps will: begin stability in Sirte; provide aid to the people of Sirte; legitimize the police forces; legitimize the GNA; and move the ostracized tribes back into Libya's political construct.

The Complexity of Achieving Stability in Sirte, Libya

Glossary of Acronyms and Terms

Al Asala Party: Sunni Jihadist aligned Libyan political party.

Ansar al Sharia: Jihadist non-state armed group with forces in the Derna and Benghazi areas in the east of Libya.

Civil-military Operations Center (CMOC): “A CMOC is formed to provide a joint force forum for organizations which want to maintain their neutrality. The CMOC receives, validates, and coordinates requests for support from NGOs, IGOs, and the private sector. The CMOC then forwards these requests to the joint force for action.”¹

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR): “DDR seeks to stabilize the OE by disarming and demobilizing warring factions and by helping former combatants reintegrate into society.”²

Explosive Remnants of War (ERW): Explosives and munitions left behind after a conflict.

Firjan Tribe: Libyan tribe aligned with Colonel Qaddafi during his reign.

General National Congress (GNC): Interim Libyan government popularly elected in 2012, disbanded by the Libyan Political Agreement, and reformed by politicians outside the internationally recognized Libyan government.

Government of National Accord (GNA): Interim Libyan government formed in 2015 under the UN-led Libyan Political Agreement (LPA).

Halbous Brigade: Non-state armed sub-group of the Misratan Militia.

High Council of State (HCS): Advisory body to the Government of National Accord established under the UN-led Libyan Political Agreement in 2015.

Homeland Party – Al Watan: Sunni Jihadist aligned Libyan political party.

House of Representatives (HoR): Legislature of Libya established in 2015 under the UN-led Libyan Political Agreement (LPA).

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC): Humanitarian institution and non-profit organization ensuring protections for the victims of war and other violent situations.

Islamist State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS): Takfiri non-state armed group attempting to establish a caliphate in Libya as it did in Syria and Iraq.

Justice and Construction Party (JCP): Libyan political party aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood.

Libyan National Army (LNA): Militia under the control of Kalifah Haftar.

Libyan Political Agreement (LPA): UN-led agreement establishing the interim Libyan government in 2015.

Magarha Tribe: Libyan tribe aligned with Colonel Qaddafi during his reign.

Mahjoub Brigade: Non-state armed sub-group of the Misratan Militia.

Misratan Militia: Militia controlling the area around the city of Misrata, seen as possibly the largest and most powerful militia in western Libya.

Muslim Brotherhood: Transnational Sunni Islamist political party founded in 1928.

National Forces Alliance (NFA): national political alliance of minor Libyan political parties.

Petroleum Facilities Guards: Militia controlling the oil production facilities in the “oil crescent” to the east of Sirte.

Qadhaffa Tribe: Colonel Qaddafi’s birth tribe, and the major tribe in the Sirte area.

Shura Council of Benghazi: Jihadist non-state armed group located in Benghazi.

Stability: The ability of a state to recover from disturbances and resist sudden change or deterioration”³

Stabilization: the process of ending or preventing the recurrence of violent conflict and creating the conditions for normal economic activity and nonviolent politics.⁴

Tripoli Brigade: Non-state armed group located in the greater Tripoli area.

US Africa Command (USAFRICOM): US Military Geographic Combatant Command responsible for all US military activities on the continent of Africa.

Warfallah Tribe: Largest tribe in Libya, aligned with Colonel Qaddafi during his reign.

Zintan Militia: Large and powerful militia aligned with Haftar and the LNA, controlling area to the southeast of Tripoli and threatening the security of Tripoli.

Scope

This paper conducts a stakeholder's analysis of Libya from the perspective of USAFRICOM. The paper identifies how the interests, desires, and agendas of these stakeholders bear on the city of Sirte, Libya. Through this process, the paper identifies the current conditions keeping stability from taking hold in the city of Sirte.

The paper then recommends preliminary steps toward stability and order in Sirte, based on the understanding gained through the use of a stakeholder's analysis. These recommendations are: execution of a demining mission; establishment of security through NATO trained Libyan police; establishment of a civil-military operations center (CMOC) with the Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli; and tribal engagement. These recommended steps will: begin stabilization in Sirte; provide limited humanitarian and demining assistance to the people of Sirte; legitimize the police forces; legitimize the GNA; and move the ostracized tribes back into Libya's political construct.

Conflict to Stability: Flawed Constructs due to Emerging Trends

A Flawed Construct

Current US military doctrine on post-conflict stabilization proposes distinct actions accounting for: security needs posed by armed groups and militias; ongoing peace negotiations; transitional justice; the humanitarian needs of a vulnerable populace, and the like.⁵ Security think-tanks and academics propose another look at traditional Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), predominantly terming it second-generation DDR.⁶

However, both current US military doctrine and academic thought seem to make a similar supposition. They both assume the existence of a state actor, a coalition, or

a legitimate government in control of the country, region or area in question. Therefore, when conducting DDR, a state actor or coalition will act from a position of authority either as the legitimate power, or through the legitimate power.

International law, notably the Geneva Convention of 1949 and its Additional Protocols I and II guide the focus of both DoD and academia. Article 69 of Additional Protocol I states the “Occupying Power” shall ensure that relief gets to the affected populace.⁷ However Article 70 of Additional Protocol I creates a conflict stating that offers of humanitarian assistance are “subject to the agreement of the Parties concerned in such relief actions.”⁸ Due to the nature of these two statements, governments and international organizations are obliged to obtain the consent of the host nation government.

This is demonstrated in Department of Defense’s (DoD) Joint Publication 3-07 STABILITY which states “The fundamentals are conflict transformation, HN [Host Nation] ownership, unity of effort, and building HN capacity.”⁹ Similarly, the United States Institute of Peace provides as its first cross-cutting principle “Host-Nation ownership and capacity.”¹⁰ This focus on the host nation meets difficulty in two distinct situations: when the situation is too violent for non-military organizations to attempt humanitarian relief; and when there is no credible party or government from which to gain agreement.

An Emerging Trend: Non-state armed groups

The conditions seen in many conflict areas today were first noted in Robert Kaplan’s work “The Coming Anarchy” in 1994.¹¹ They include the breakdown of social order, incessant crime, disease, hopelessness, refugee migration, and resource scarcity in seen in West African countries. In his seminal work, Kaplan noted that “In the poor

quarters of Arab North Africa there is much less crime, because Islam provides a social anchor: of education and indoctrination.”¹²

Mary Kaldor’s work in 1999 made the observation that there was a “blurring of the lines between war, organized crime, and large-scale human rights violations. She termed this “New War” and brought to the forefront the idea of organized violence in an era of globalization.¹³ Since then, a vast body of knowledge has accumulated in the field of non-state armed groups and their impact on society.

There is a growing body of evidence that a state actor, coalition or legitimate government may not control a country, region or area in need of stabilization.¹⁴ The conflicts in Somalia, Yemen, and Syria demonstrate the idea that programs underpinning stability must move forward, but that the parties providing these programs may not be acting from a position of traditional authority.¹⁵

In Somalia, a decades long failed state, there exist governments in Puntland, Somaliland, and Mogadishu, as well as areas wholly controlled by al Shabaab.¹⁶ No actor has the ability to conduct DDR, nor would DDR be appropriate in Somalia. Implementing DDR would likely create a power vacuum, leading to greater instability, as seen in other DDR attempts such as Afghanistan.¹⁷

In Yemen, the government is under siege, the populace subjected to a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran, while whole swaths of the country are ruled by al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) .¹⁸ As of January 2018, the capital of Sanaa has fallen to Houthi rebels, the country is facing a cholera outbreak while on the verge of the worst famine the world has seen in decades.¹⁹ Although Yemen is in a state in conflict, once areas of the country achieve a cessation of hostilities it is unlikely that a

single legitimate power will be in place. Yet a profound need for stability and humanitarian assistance will remain.

Syria, a country ravaged by civil war since 2011, has a central government in control of a portion of the country. However non-state armed groups numbering as many as 1000 in 2013, rising to possibly 1500 groups in 2015, control pockets of north and east Syria, while the Islamic state (ISIS) now controls areas to the south.^{20 21} Due to the pocketing of control seen across Syria, areas in the northeast and northwest receive little aid from the international community, while these populations are in great need. This lack of aid has as much to do with the security situation as it does with international law and a general unwillingness among the international community to compromise the aid already approved by the Assad regime. As in Somalia and Yemen, it is unlikely that there will be a single controlling entity in Syria for some time, yet the need for stabilization in many of these pockets will remain for decades.

In many similar situations, external actors looking to begin programs toward stability are unable to work through a legitimate actor and cannot assume that role themselves. The ensuing problem then is how to implement programs that lead from a cessation of hostilities to stabilization and lasting order when unable to work from any position of authority.

Libya: Context for Understanding Sirte

“The government is polarized and the government has been paralyzed by the battle between the two parliaments using religious discourse and mixed with social, political, economic, ethnic, and tribal agendas.”²²

Overview

Sirte lies on the Mediterranean coast of Libya, on the northwest corner of the oil crescent. This former resort town of 80,000 people, home of the Qadafiah tribe, is remembered as both the birthplace and final resting place of Colonel Muammar Qaddafi.^{23 24} In the final days of the Libyan revolution, Qaddafi found himself on the run in Sirte, where he was ultimately executed by militias on October 20, 2011, ending his forty-two-year reign.²⁵

Sirte became an ISIS stronghold of 3,000 fighters in February 2015.²⁶ Ultimately ISIS transformed Sirte into its capital in Tripolitania, described as ISIS' "Raqqah" of Libya.²⁷ Along the way the world witnessed ISIS' bloody execution of 21 Egyptian Coptic Christians on the beaches of Sirte, and then the brutal retaking of the city by Misratan militias during Operations "Solid Structure" destroying over 8,000 buildings in the process.^{28 29 30} Sirte's inhabitants described the city during this operation as a "Libyan Dresden".³¹

Stakeholder's Analysis

Principal Stakeholder: US Africa Command

US Africa Command (USAFRICOM) is the principal stakeholder regarding stabilization in Libya. US policy on Libya seems less murky since May 2017, following the joint visit of both the US Ambassador and Commanding General USAFRICOM GEN Thomas Waldhauser.³² In this visit the United States formally backed the UN supported Government of National Accord (GNA). Although the GNA is nominally in control of Tripoli, if only through political alignment with militias, the GNA's control of the country is far more limited, with an eastern boundary of Sirte (see Appendix F).^{33 34}

However, American interests are less likely to be served by the weaker GNA, and therefore the US continues to deal directly with various armed groups, primarily the House of Representatives (HoR) aligned Khalifa Haftar and his Libyan National Army (LNA).³⁵ This direct engagement comes at the risk of undermining the GNA and the peace process.³⁶

Much of the US engagement in Libya narrowly focuses on the defeat of ISIS as a way of achieving gains against the interests listed in Table 1 below.³⁷ However, the defeat of ISIS is not a broad enough strategy to address Libya’s current state of instability. Gaining stability and order in Libya is paramount to addressing greater regional issues such as the refugee crisis, petroleum pricing in Europe, and greater geopolitical interests in Africa and the Mediterranean.

Table 1. Principal Stakeholder -- US Africa Command

Type	Group	Interests	Resources	Capacity to mobilize resources	Position
Principal Stake Holder	US Africa Command ³⁸	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Stability in Africa and Middle East • Regional stability as Africa affects Europe • Decreasing the flow of refugees from Libya • Support to the US Embassy in Tunis • Support US, EU, AU, NATO influence • Destruction of ISIS • Counter Russian influence in Africa, Europe, and the Mediterranean 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Vast potential military engagement, cooperation, and operational capability 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Constrained by the number of commitments in Africa, but as robust as US policy allows it to increase 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Recently State Department formally backed the GNA, putting them at odds with HoR and Haftar • Since then State Department has met with Haftar, although no outcome is public

Libya's Governing Bodies

Libya's governing bodies are described in the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) signed in December 2015.³⁹ Although the LPA proscribes the Government of National Accord (GNA) as the executive body, and the House of Representatives (HoR) as the legislative body, they both act unilaterally and in their own interests.⁴⁰ Further complicating matters, the previously formed but now illegitimate General National Congress (GNC) reformed themselves outside the mandate of the LPA. This created a third body attempting to govern the country.⁴¹ Additionally, Libya has a Supreme Court functioning as the head judicial body and providing a check on both the GNA and HoR.⁴² Finally a High Council of State (HCS) exists as an advisory board to both the GNA and HoR.⁴³

With the exception of the Supreme Court, each of these bodies has shown a desire to rule the country. The HCS recently made a plea to receive status equal to that of the GNA and HoR, potentially resulting in a fourth body vying for national power.

The UN mandated, less powerful executive branch, the GNA, is seated in Tripoli, aligned with the Misratan militias (see Table 2). This alignment provides the GNA strength at times convenient to the militias yet weakens the GNA's position overall. Although the Misratan militia re-took the city of Sirte, they have no interest in doing more, and are unlikely to have the strength to retake the oil crescent (see Appendices E, F, and G) from Haftar's LNA. Neither the GNA nor the Misratans seem capable of full control over Tripoli, while the power of the HoR and Haftar grows with each passing day. Although the GNA enjoys the support of the US, Italy, the EU, AU, and UN, there is little strength from this support (see Table 8).

The HoR, seated in Tobruk and aligned with Haftar and the LNA, has the strongest alliance in Libya at present. As the strongest military power, the LNA controls much of eastern Libya, and is pushing further west (see Appendices E, F, and G). Through this alliance, the HoR retains control of the oil crescent, which provides the greatest economic power in Libya (Appendix G).

Military and economic strength make the HoR and Haftar much sought after partners of many countries including the United States, France, Russia, UAE, Egypt, and China (see Table 8) as well as private businesses (see Tables 9 and 10). In the case of the UAE and Egypt these alignments can also be traced to Haftar's desire to rid Libya of the Muslim Brotherhood, Qaddafi's party, known as the Justice and Construction Party (JCP).^{44 45}

Although an illegitimate governing body, the GNC enjoys the support of Turkey and Qatar who reportedly fund and arm the GNC, violating the United Nations Arms Embargo.^{46 47} This relationship seems due to strong membership in the GNC of the Justice and Construction Party (JCP) members. This membership is due to a law passed in May 2013 that former members of the Qaddafi regime should not serve in Libya's government.⁴⁸ The result of the law was that up to 500,000 Libyans were likely ostracized, this high number due to the large government payroll in Libya, employing nearly 1.8 million people.^{49 50} This GNC-Turkey-Qatar relationship is also likely due to support for Salafist leanings in both Turkey and Qatar (see Tables 2, 3, 4, and 8 for more).⁵¹

Table 2. Libya's Governing Bodies

Type	Group	Interests	Resources	Capacity	Position
Libyan Governing body / ministries	Government of National Accord (GNA) ⁵²	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Legitimate Executive Power of the country, recognized by UN and EU • Do not control the Oil crescent (wealth of country) • Counter LNA and HoR influence in the East • Counter Russian Influence in East • Stem the flow of refugees into Europe 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Limited financial resources • Aligned with Misratan Militia, but limited personnel • Backing of many international actors, but those many lack the will to take a strong position 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Limited 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Will continue to work toward a recognized government • May attempt to fight Haftar's forces if pushed to do so, but not necessarily a good course of action
	House of Representatives (HoR) ⁵³	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Legitimate Legislative Power of the country, recognized by UN and EU • Controls the Oil Crescent through Haftar • Counter GNA influence in the West • Russian Influence in Libya • Stem the flow of refugees into Europe 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Vast resources due to oil revenues, economic, military and political backing by Russia, France, UAE, and Egypt • Control of the LNA may give them access to the most powerful of the militias, hard to determine however 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Limited by themselves. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Will continue to work to supplant the GNA as the recognized Executive branch, and consolidate power • May attempt a forcible takeover of Tripoli through Haftar and the LNA
	Supreme Court ⁵⁴	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lawful Judicial Power of the country, recognized by UN and EU • Have shown desire to act in this capacity and not supplant the GNA or HoR 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Limited 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Very limited capacity 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Will continue to work toward a unity government

	General National Congress (GNC) ⁵⁵	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unrecognized resurrection of the previous GNC, Third party power government with little influence • Desire to Supplant the GNA and HoR as the active government 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Funded and Armed by the Turkey and Qatar 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • None without support from Turks and Qataris. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Will continue to attempt to supplant the GNA and HoR and assume control of Libya
	High Council of State (HCS) ⁵⁶	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Advisory role to the GNA and HoR • Desire for Unity government • Sided with UN, EU and the west 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • International recognition 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • None 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Will continue to advise as a means to unify the government • Recently called for equality with HoR

Libya’s Political Parties

Libya’s political parties take on a tribal dynamic.⁵⁷ This is due to the 130 parties in the country, and their close affiliation with the nearly 140 tribes. Of these 130 parties, only 10 seem to be national political parties.⁵⁸ Focusing on just two of these will provide some clarity to the situation.

The Justice and Construction Party(JCP), seen as the arm of the Muslim Brotherhood in Libya, was the ruling party under Qaddafi.^{59 60} The JCP therefore is pitted against Egypt, the UAE, the HoR, and Haftar (see Tables 2, 4, and 8). Although facing incredible opposition, the JCP has solidified its position as a leading national party looking to regain its place in national politics.

The National Forces Alliance (NFA) is currently the leading party in many elections, is the most secular of the major parties, and has a strong showing in the GNA. However, the NFA’s politicians are beholden to militias over which they have no

control. These politicians are also known to come from predominantly privileged classes. The resulting dynamic is that the NFA has no power through the threat of force, nor the support of the common class of people. Hence, the NFA has little influence outside Tripoli.

The simple analysis of political parties reveals that they are not a unifying force among the people, they compete with multiple governing bodies vying for power, have little to no control over any military force, and are pervaded with tribalism. They may become a factor in Libya's politics once a true unity government stands on its own, but not before.

Table 3. Libyan Political Parties

Type	Group	Interests	Resources	Capacity	Position
Political Party	Justice and Construction Party (JCP) (Muslim Brotherhood) ⁶¹	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Regain formal inclusion into the government • Re-establish influence in the government due to ostracization • Decrease pressure on party from other Arab nations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Limited but gaining as they gain greater support in the country 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Capacity is growing as they gain more support in Libya. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • May be the majority party in the next year to continued support among the people • Recently attacked Grand Mufti Ghariani in the press
	National Forces Alliance (privileged class) ^{62 63}	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Primary and most successful party in elections • Supporting the GNA and LPA • Head to head struggle with JCP 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Larger than JCP, but struggling 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Limited 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gain majority in GNA and consolidate the unity government • Progressive as compared to the rest of the parties
	Al Asala (Salafist, aligned with Grand Mufti Ghariani) ⁶⁴	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Promote the Salafist, Sunni religion • Gain influence in the wake of the ISIS loss 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Limited 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Limited 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Work to consolidate position of power with Sunni's

	Homeland Party - Al Watan (Salafist) ⁶⁵	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Promote the Salafist, Sunni religion • Gain influence in the wake of the ISIS loss 	• Limited	• Limited	• Led by former emir of LIFG, Belhaj
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Libya’s Armed Groups

Libya’s armed groups and militias are prolific. They wield power across the country, are courted by the world’s major powers, and show no sign of disarming (see Tables 4 and 8). Due to the weak central government, and the divergent interests of the armed groups from the political process, the armed groups will be the power brokers in Libya until the central government can match their force, rather than be beholden to it.⁶⁶

Because of this powerbroker dynamic among the armed groups, and the fact that they align more tribally than politically, there is a city-state effect that has evolved across the country.⁶⁷ It can be observed in the names of the militias: Zintan, Misratan, Shura Council of Benghazi, etc. This city-state effect remains today, and will only be undone by a unifying force, either a legitimate government or a significant strongman. Therefore, rather than discuss the multitude of armed groups, discussing the general alignments, interests, and impacts is more useful.

Libya’s armed groups are aligned generally in an eastern and western manner, beholden to either the Libyan National Army (LNA) in the east, or the Misratan militia in the west (see Table 5). This idea of alignment wrongly gives the impression of order and control. Militias often operate independent of the LNA in the eastern alignment with examples of the Zintani (actually southwest of Tripoli) and other armed groups aligned with the LNA and HoR having backed the GNC due to Salafi leanings.⁶⁸

Due to their backing by multiple state actors, their general unification under Haftar, and their recent re-taking of the “Oil Crescent,” the armed groups aligned with the LNA in the east wield significantly greater power than those aligned with the Misratan militia in the west (see Appendices F and G). It is likely that Haftar will conduct operations with the Zintan militia to seize Tripoli and install the HoR or himself as the single legitimate government, as he attempted once before in 2014.⁶⁹ Thus, the LNA with Russian backing is now reportedly making inroads to the south among the Tebu and Tuaregs.⁷⁰

The western militias aligned with the Misratan militia will have a difficult time staving off Haftar’s push when it comes. Although the Misratans are the largest militias, unlike the eastern aligned militias, the militias in the west have no firm backing from external governments, have far less oil revenue (see Appendix G), and no single entity controls Tripoli (see Appendix F).⁷¹ This continued competition among the western militias has taken its toll on Sirte.

Although the Misratans freed Sirte from ISIS, in the months immediately following the revolution the Misratans took revenge on the inhabitants of Sirte. This was due to Sirte’s tribal affiliation with Qaddafi.⁷² Only once ISIS operations began spreading west did the Misratans conduct an operation to clear Sirte, resulting in hundreds of lives lost, and more than 8000 homes destroyed.^{73 74} No militia has emerged from Sirte with revolutionary ties, nor credibility, and Sirte has largely been excluded from new Libya due to their ties with Qaddafi.⁷⁵

Table 4. Libya’s Armed Groups

Type	Group	Interests	Resources	Capacity	Position
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<p>Armed Group, Aligned in the East</p>	<p>Libyan National Army (Haftar)⁷⁶</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Defeat of ISIS • Retaking of Oil Facilities • Consolidation of Power in East • Align with Russia, EU countries, and any backer that will support his legitimacy • Destroy Salafist ideology 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tens of thousands of militia • Oil Revenues, and majority of control of oil production • Support of GCC, Russia, and EU countries • Support of some Libyan factions opposed to Salafists 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Great militia capacity, significant fiscal support and control of banking in east • Russian printing of billions of Libyan Dinar went to fund LNA 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ultimately Haftar and the LNA will attempt to retake land west, including Tripoli • Haftar does not currently have the force to fight to Tripoli but that could change with Russian backing
	<p>Zintan Militia⁷⁷</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Defeat of ISIS • Power within Tripoli 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Several thousand fighters, supplied by UAE 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Limited 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Will side with the LNA and Haftar • Fought the Misratans for dominance in Tripoli • Will continue to look for opportunities to gain a dominant role in the western side of the country
	<p>Ansar al Sharia⁷⁸</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Remain a Salafist organization with influence in the east • Al Qaeda affiliate 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Limited 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Limited 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Will remain salafi, but will support the HoR and Haftar as necessary
	<p>Shura Council of Benghazi Battalions⁷⁹</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Salafist organization looking for influence in the east 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Limited 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Limited 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Will remain salafi, but will support the HoR and Haftar as necessary
	<p>Petroleum Facilities Guards⁸⁰</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Security of oil facilities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Limited 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Very limited 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Currently within the controlled area of the HoR • Will take the position of Ibrahim Jadhra, a militia CDR in Adjibiyah, linked to Islamists
<p>Armed Group, Aligned in the West</p>	<p>Misratan Militia⁸¹</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Security of GNA, Misrata, and tribes in the West • Destruction of ISIS • Oil Output 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Thousands of fighters and strongest militia, may be greater than LNA and Haftar 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Great militia capacity 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Largely will side with the GNA and legitimate government proposed by the UN

	Halbous Brigade ⁸²	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Part of the Misratan militia, but not entirely • Fought to retake Sirte from ISIS 	• Limited	• Limited	• Remain aligned with Misratan militias and GNA
	Mahjoub Brigade ⁸³	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Part of the Misratan militia, but not entirely • Fought to retake Sirte from ISIS 	• Limited	• Limited	• Remain aligned with Misratan militias and GNA
	Tripoli Brigade ⁸⁴	• Security of the Capital, and the GNA	• Several thousand fighters	• Limited to a small militia presence	
Takfiri, Unaligned	ISIS ⁸⁵	• Securing an area to establish the caliphate	• Limited with the fall of Raqqa and Mosul, and greater emphasis placed on their destruction by many parties	• Weakening, but numbers still in the hundreds	• Will continue to fight, transition to an insurgency, and wait for an opportunity to retake land

Libya’s Tribes

“Libyan tribalism is growing stronger due to the post Qaddafi legacy and the failure of the post Qaddafi state to provide social security for its people.”⁸⁶ In some expert opinions, it’s tribalism including that of Farej Najem that preserved Islam in Libya for fourteen centuries.⁸⁷ Tribalism provides a rallying point within Libya’s society, a consistency that Libyans rely upon in times both good and bad.

Playing such a large role in Libya, the tribes number around 140, with 30-40 of these being of true national influence (see Appendix A).⁸⁸ Much of the tribal dynamics today go back to Qaddafi’s rule, the tribe he hailed from, and those tribes he chose to empower for the sake of his regime. Qaddafi hailed from the Qadhaffa tribe, not a well-known nor powerful tribe prior to his ascent.⁸⁹ Qaddafi chose unsurprisingly to empower his own tribe through influx of cash, military facilities and weaponry, and political positions. The city Sirte flourished in the process. In the interim Qaddafi would need

more influence than his own tribe to solidify his position. In the long-term, Qaddafi's favoritism would drive a wedge between his tribe and the city of Sirte, and the rest of the country.

Qaddafi began to partner with and empower other tribes, notably the largest and most powerful in Libya, the Warfallah tribe.⁹⁰ During his reign, the Warfallah tribe was both his ally and adversary, participating in his government but many seeing themselves as loyal to Libya, not to Qaddafi.⁹¹ Today the Warfallah, seated in Bani Walid, are largely held out of Libyan politics due to their linkages to the regime. Yet they have succeeded in establishing possibly the most stable city in Libya.⁹²

Qaddafi's outreach to the Magarha and Firjan tribes resulted in the same effect of casting them on the outside of new Libya. For both these tribes, predominantly in the west / southwest of the country as well as the Sirte area, inclusion in the political process is a desired future outcome.

The casting out of the Qadhaffa and Warfallah tribes had quite a detrimental effect on Sirte. Many of the tribal youth began helping ISIS prior to and during the occupation, primarily for political rather than religious or ideological reasons.^{93 94} This only put further distance between the people and tribes of Sirte, and those who control various aspects of the new Libya.

Table 5. Libya's Tribes

Type	Group	Interests	Resources	Capacity	Position
Tribe	Qadhaffa (majority in Sirte) ⁹⁵	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Re-establish power and gain admittance in the government • Sided with Salafists and ISIS post revolution • Rebuild their homes and re-establish infrastructure 	• None	• None	• Will continue to be on the outs with all parties due to their 42-year reign through Qaddafi
	Warfallah (largest in Libya, Berber and Amazigah roots) ⁹⁶	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No recognition of ANY post-revolutionary institutions • Rebuild their homes and re-establish infrastructure • Looking for Neutral institutions. • Unique Transitional justice issues related to support to Qaddafi, and harboring of high profile criminals 	• Largest (1M), Most powerful and armed tribe during the Qaddafi era due to their loyalty to him	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Limited due to ostracism, and lack of desire to participate • Controls all aspects of government in Bani Walid (west of Sirte) through the Warfallah Social Council (WSC), although no legal mandate nor recognition 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Will continue to hold out until a better offer from a neutral government is made • Rising crime rates and detention of Warfallah youth in other areas may lead them to negotiate
	Magarha ⁹⁷	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Regain inclusion into the government • Rebuild their homes and re-establish infrastructure 	• Only through militia support	• Limited due to ostracism	• Will continue to make headway into the government
	Firjan ⁹⁸	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Regain inclusion into the government • Rebuild their homes and re-establish infrastructure 	• Only through militia support	• Limited due to ostracism	• Will continue to make headway into the government

Libya's Ethnic Groups

The role of ethnic factor in Libya's politics is minor due to 97% of the country being of Arab or Berber descent (see Table 6).⁹⁹ This homogeneity in the north of Libya does not extend to the southern areas where there is an ongoing rift between the Tebu

and Tuareg (see Appendix A).¹⁰⁰ However, this rift plays little role in the construct of the new Libya.

Table 6. Ethnicities

Type	Group	Interests	Resources	Capacity	Position
Ethnicity	Arab / Berber ¹⁰¹	• 97% of Population	• NA	• Vast majority of Libyans are Arab	• Maintain position as majority and powerbroker in Libya
	Amazigah		• NA	• Second largest ethnic population in Libya	• Maintain position in western regions
	Tuareg ¹⁰²	• Transitory population	• NA		• Fighting Tebu in south
	Tebu ¹⁰³	• Transitory population	• NA		• Fighting Tuareg in south

Religions and Religious Figures

Libya is a strongly Sunni Muslim country, and during one brief period from 2007-2008 more young men per capita joining ISI (al Qaeda affiliate in Iraq) than any other Muslim country.¹⁰⁴ This indicates that conditions in Libya were ripe for a disenfranchised youth to take up arms. Following the fall of the regime in 2011 these conditions would provide the fertile ground necessary for ISIS to take the city of Sirte.

With ISIS assassination of Sufi Imam Khalid bin Rajab Ferjani in August 2015, all the leading religious figures left in Libya are Salafist leaning Sunni Muslims.¹⁰⁵ No moderate Sunni leadership acts as a counter-balance today. NATO's intervention, in some opinions, created room for the Islamic radicalization seen today.¹⁰⁶ These strong religious tendencies, fertile jihadist soil, and lack of a counter-balance take an interesting turn when speaking to the Libyans themselves however.

In a 2016 survey, 9 out of 10 respondents stated they felt the leading religious figures (see Table 7) have a negative effect on peace and justice.¹⁰⁷ Additionally,

Libyans seem to wildly overestimate jihadist and Muslim Brotherhood tendencies in many of the major cities (see Appendices B, C, and D). And in 2017, when asked who the local Imam of their mosque was, many Libyans did not know, nor was it important to them.¹⁰⁸

Libya's leading religious leader, Grand Mufti Ghariani, would be thought to have some influence with the Libyan people. However, his attempts in 2012, issuing a fatwa to halt the murder of Libyan Army officers after the revolution had no effect.¹⁰⁹ This may indicate that religion is influential, but that religious leaders are not as likely to sway the populace.

Sirte, a counter-revolutionary stronghold, was governed temporarily by Ansar al Sharia until an ISIS coup. Clearly susceptible to Salafi and Takfiri leanings, and on the road to the religious jihadi hotbeds of Derna and Benghazi, Sirte is clearly at risk of becoming a jihadi hotbed itself (see Appendix B and C), while the greater country is unlikely to yield to the jihadist influence.

Table 7. Religious Figures

Type	Group	Interests	Resources	Capacity	Position
Personality	Grand Mufti Ghariani ¹¹⁰	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No support to LPA • No Support to HoR • No support to Presidency Council • No support to Haftar and LNA 	• Unknown	• Unknown	• Salafi supporter
	Ali al Salabi ¹¹¹	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Salafist, former LIFG • Ties to Qatar and Turkey 	• Unknown	• Unknown	• Anti-Qaddafi Salafi supporter
	Abdel Hakim Belhaj ¹¹²	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Former Emir LIFG • Current leader al Watan Political Party 	• Unknown	• Unknown	• Anti-Qaddafi Salafi supporter

External Actors

Libya is rife with external actors, all vying for degrees of influence, elements of dominance, or the opportunity to spoil the influence of others. It is no surprise that Libya, an oil rich rentier state, would find itself vulnerable and caught between many international actors, both state and non-state.¹¹³

Prior to the 2011 Libyan revolution against Qaddafi's regime, Russian companies made multi-billion-dollar oil and infrastructure deals in Libya. These included oil exploration, the construction of a railway from Sirte to Benghazi, and a \$6 billion deal for power generation plants.¹¹⁴ Following a visit by Vladimir Putin in 2008, the Russian government even forgave a Libyan debt of \$4.5 billion in exchange for the signing of military and civilian contracts.¹¹⁵ Further, the Russians sold billions of dollars in arms to Libya over a two-decade period.¹¹⁶

Russia, taking a leading role in the outcome of Libya has sided with the HoR and backed Haftar, flying him to Moscow twice.¹¹⁷ In May 2016 Russia printed \$2.9 billion (4 billion Libyan Dinar), and delivered it to Benghazi's banks.¹¹⁸ In return Haftar has offered the Russians a Naval Base in Benghazi, and would likely welcome Russian military assistance.¹¹⁹ In an unsurprising move, the Russian government stated recently it was ready to ease the UN arms embargo on Libya, which would allow it to resume sales and support.¹²⁰

Russia's goals are straightforward. First, solidify its military position in the Mediterranean, influencing Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. Second, apply pressure to European countries through domination of the hydrocarbon market.¹²¹ Third, spoil NATO's influence in its own backyard. Fourth and finally, to recoup its financial losses in Libya.

On the other side, China has seemingly avoided significant involvement in Libya, primarily due to the economic losses they felt due to the 2011 revolution.¹²² With recent news releases that Chinese companies will make large investments in Libyan infrastructure it seems they may have shaken off their losses and intend to pursue some influence in Libya.¹²³ This should in no way indicate they will take a leading role, nor even a military role, but that economically they see the promise of influence over markets in Europe and Africa.

France, as with much in North Africa, is taking a leading European role in Libya. Although supporting the UN backed GNA, France seems to be more strongly courting Haftar and the HoR with the placement of French forces in eastern Libya and recently hosting Haftar in Paris.^{124 125} This seems to be a bit of hedging, as well as an attempt to move Haftar away from Russia, thereby increasing France's prominence in the process. Of course, France has a vested interest in the Russian's not gaining too much influence over the European gas markets as well. The stability that France, and the rest of Europe seeks is directly tied to the refugee crisis emanating from Syria primarily, but also from Libya and North Africa.

Italy, typically seen as the European lead on Libyan affairs due to its proximity as well as colonial history, has nearly been brushed aside by France's efforts. Until recently Italy was the strongest backer of the Tripoli based GNA, but as of September began courting Haftar in similar fashion to Paris.¹²⁶ Italy provides assistance in policing the seas, developing the Libyan Coast Guard, training Libyan police, and working in the west with militias to counter ISIS.¹²⁷ However, their influence in Libya is minimal while their interests concerning gas prices and refugees mirror those of France. As evidence

of their energy interests, Italian company ENI announced in 2017 they had found new gas deposits off the Libyan coast.¹²⁸

The United Kingdom, although taking the position of supporting the GNA, have recognized Haftar and stated he has a place in the political process.¹²⁹ Having pledged money for demining, the UK seems to be hedging a bit.¹³⁰ Although the UK would welcome a decrease in the refugee flow from Libya, a bigger concern is the price of oil, particularly during the period of Brexit.

Qatar and Turkey are seemingly working together, counter to the efforts of the UN backed GNA. Both countries are supporting the illegitimate GNC, some say with lethal aid in violation of the UN arms embargo.¹³¹ Although Turkey backs the GNC, they are assisting with training of Libyan police in an effort to restore some stability.¹³²

The interests of Qatar and Turkey are in line with their desire to have control over aspects of oil pricing, a desire to thwart the efforts of the US, the UAE and Egypt, and the promotion of Salafism and the Muslim Brotherhood. Qatar took an early position as a leading Arab country against the regime, has continued this approach by facilitating Libyan oil exports, and owns a 49% interest in the Bank of Commerce and Development in Benghazi.¹³³

Qatar will continue their support to the GNC if only to thwart the efforts of other Gulf countries due to the recent trade blockades imposed on it. Similarly, Turkey has an axe to grind with the United States, the UK and France concerning support to the Kurds in Syria and will therefore maintain its support to the GNC. The efforts of these two countries will unlikely change Libya's political future, but will extend that timeline and frustrate the efforts of other external actors.

As if to act as a counter-poise to the efforts of Qatar and Turkey, Egypt and the UAE support Haftar and the HoR in the east.¹³⁴ This is primarily due to Haftar’s desire to root out the Muslim Brotherhood. However, Emirati based companies are taking large stakes in oil rights, and although not government owned, these actions do increase the influence of the UAE. Egypt, with less stake in the oil market, has a clearly stated desire to counter the Muslim Brotherhood, and with its shared border has the ability to assist Haftar, and allow others this same ability.^{135 136}

While not taking a leading political role, the Netherlands has taken the lead in providing demining capabilities to Libya. This assistance is the focal point for the removal of the explosive remnants of war (ERW) that persist in many areas of Libya and truly confound any efforts to provide humanitarian assistance to the local populace.

Finally, the UN, EU and AU have all taken a position of supporting the UN backed GNA, although their varying support is relatively meager and unable to assist in militarily solidifying their political stake. Unless and until these treaty organizations form a concerted coalition, they will be unlikely to have significant influence, and in the case of the UN and EU, will continue to see their own members take complicating positions.

Table 8. External Actors

Type	Group	Interests	Resources	Capacity	Position
Extra-Territorial Governments / Treaty Organizations	African Union ¹³⁷	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Influence in Africa • Legitimacy as an organization • Stability on the continent 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • None at this time 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • None without a consensus vote 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • They support the UN led effort, but are not doing anything that looks like contribution

	China ^{138 139}	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Investment in infrastructure Influence over gas and oil prices Continued movement toward superpower status 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 36Bn investment in projects Large military capability 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Extremely large capacity, but not committed 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> With the loss of investments in 2011 China appears to be reticent to move too quickly into the Libyan fray
	Egypt ¹⁴⁰	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Stability on its borders Cooperation with Western countries/NATO Cooperation with Russia Increased influence through legitimacy after SISI coup Cleansing of Muslim Brotherhood (JCP in Libya) Cooperation with UAE 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Limited in all areas, but still conducting military operations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Very limited capacity 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Allowed Russian Basing in Egypt Supporting Haftar and HoR Aligned with UAE Against the JCP and Muslim Brotherhood
	EU	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Low Oil and Gas Prices Counter Russian Influence Limit Refugees into EU 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Limited Member nations already contributing 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Large but no consensus across EU countries on what to do or who to back 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> In line with the UN, but not homogenous across all EU countries
	France ¹⁴¹	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Regional Influence in support of NATO and UN Influence over Their own cost of gas and oil Counter Russian influence in the Region Stem the flow of refugees to Europe 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Cash investment Military cooperation and training Assistance in Humanitarian aid and infrastructure Training of Libyan police Offered to host negotiations this past summer 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Significant but not overwhelming capacity in all areas of National power 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Aligned with NATO, US and West Courting Haftar to counter Russian influence

	Italy ¹⁴²	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Regional Influence in support of NATO and UN • Influence over Their own cost of gas and oil • Counter Russian influence in the Region • Stem the flow of refugees to Europe • Maintain their precedent at the primary intermediary with Libya due to Colonialism 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cash investment • Military cooperation and training • Assistance in Humanitarian aid and infrastructure • Training of Libyan police • Leads the EU's migrant mission, training Libyan Coast Guard 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Significant but not overwhelming capacity in all areas of National power 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Aligned with NATO, US and West • Backing the GNA • Skeptical of Haftar, but courting him • Upset at France for supplanting them in negotiations
	Qatar ^{143 144}	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Regional Influence over conflicts, and oil production • Cooperation with Western countries/NATO • Increased influence through legitimacy • Cooperation with Turkey • Increased influence through legitimacy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Large cash investment • Minor military cooperation • Potential significant Arms contribution • Assistance in Oil industry 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Large economic capacity, therefore large potential arms influx, limited in all other areas 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Aligned with NATO, US and West • Supporting the GNC in Tripoli • Interested in the West's help in ending Saudi led blockade
	Netherlands ¹⁴⁵	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Humanitarian assistance • ERW clearance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Limited 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Limited 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lead for demining in Libya
	Russia ¹⁴⁶	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Regional Influence outside the confines of Slavic states and Europe • Influence over European Gas and oil prices • Military Basing in the Mediterranean • Counter US, EU, NATO influence and expansion 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Large cash investment • Government owned and controlled global companies • Military sales, training and cooperation • Counter US, EU, NATO 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Large and well used capacity in all areas of National Power 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Partnered with Haftar • Printing money for the HoR and Haftar • Attempting military sales • Made gas and oil exploration deals • May attempt reconstruction of Sirte through construction companies • Potential Naval Basing offered by Haftar

			influence and expansion		
	Tunisia ¹⁴⁷	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Stability on its borders • Cooperation with Western countries/NATO/UN • Stability internal to Tunisia • Decreased Arms flow from Libya • Oil and Gas pipeline from Libya to Tunisia 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Limited, but they facilitate nearly all external Humanitarian Aid into Libya • Hosted Libyan GNA when first active • Hosting UN led talks to reconcile inter-governmental issues in Libya 	• Limited	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Not taking a side currently, looking for stability
	Turkey ¹⁴⁸	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Regional Influence outside the normal confines • Influence over European Gas and oil prices • Counter Russian Military Basing in the Mediterranean • Counter Russian Influence • Stem the flow of refugees into Europe • Support to the GNC puts them at odds with the UN and west, and allows them influence in other areas 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Significant military resources • Limited \$ due to commitments in Syria and the ME • Sided with GNC and Qatar 	• Limited	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Supporting the UN initiatives through training of Libyan police, but countering the UN process though support to the GNC • Pro-islamist and Pro-muslim brotherhood

	UAE ¹⁴⁹	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Stability on its borders • Cooperation with Western countries/NATO • Cooperation with Russia • Increased influence • Cleansing of Muslim Brotherhood (JCP in Libya) • Cooperation with Egypt • UAE Al Ghurair owns 50% of Ras Lanuf oil refinery, largest in Libya 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Large cash investment • More significant military cooperation • Potential significant Arms contribution • Assistance in Oil industry 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Large financial potential, limited military potential 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Supporting Haftar and HoR • Aligned with EGYPT • Against the JCP and Muslim Brotherhood • Will work to solidify their position as a regional power
	UK ¹⁵⁰	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Regional Influence in support of the UN and NATO • Influence over European Gas and oil prices • Blunt Russian interests and influence 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pledged \$6million, \$4 million to Demining of Sirte • Military training of coast guard • Met with Haftar Following French meetings 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Limited capacity, but very capable 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Aligned with NATO, US and West, but have taken a position backing Haftar
	UN ¹⁵¹	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Primary negotiator for institution of governance in Libya • Role of not seeing Russian influence grow too greatly • Limit Human Trafficking and Slave trade from Libya 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No resources without UNSCR or member vote • Aid flowing through Tunisia 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Limited without a vote in the UN 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continues to negotiate with Libyan parties to gain a consensus government

International Companies

The international companies staking claims to resources and infrastructure projects in Libya are proceeding on a course that benefits them and the nations they hail from (see Table 9). Although these companies may not be under the direct control

of Russia, China, the UAE, etc., they certainly benefit from a position that is in line with their respective nations. The actions of these companies may be of some benefit to Sirte as there is a great need for reconstruction, the jobs that it would bring.

Table 9. International Companies

Type	Group	Interests	Resources	Capacity	Position
International Companies	Al Ghurair (UAE) ¹⁵²	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Making deals with Libyan Companies • Influence for the Emirati government 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Vast economic resources 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unknown 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mirrors UAE position
	Gazprom (Russian) ¹⁵³	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Making deals with Libyan Cos • Influence for the Russian government 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Vast economic resources: technology, personnel, funds, political connections 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unknown 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mirrors Russia's position
	Rosneft (Russian) ¹⁵⁴	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Making deals with Libyan Cos • Influence for the Russian government 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Vast economic resources 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unknown 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mirrors Russia's position
	Technopromexport (Russian) ¹⁵⁵	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Making deals with Libyan Cos • Influence for the Russian government 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Vast economic resources in power engineering 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unknown 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mirrors Russia's position
	ENI (Italian) ¹⁵⁶	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Making deals with Libyan Cos • Influence for the Italian government 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Vast economic resources 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unknown 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mirrors Italy's position

Libyan Companies

Libyan companies act as weather vanes indicating the direction Libya is headed. Although they alone do not determine political outcomes in Libya, without banks friendly to Haftar, Russia would not print and deliver money. These companies will in ways favorable to their corporate leadership and the leanings of their local environment. If

they are any predictor of the political outcome, they indicate that Haftar and the HoR will, in large part succeed.

Table 10. Libyan Companies

Type	Group	Interests	Resources	Capacity	Position
Libyan National Companies	Bank of Commerce and Development Benghazi ¹⁵⁷	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Making deals with Russian Companies • Receiving printed money from Russian government • Qatar owns a 49% interest in the bank • Need to survive in a HoR and Haftar controlled environment that was ripe for Islamist control 	• Limited	• Limited	• Looking to preserve their own position and future.
	Central Bank of Libya ¹⁵⁸	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Economic future of the country 	• Limited	• Limited	• Looking to preserve their own position, will hedge on both sides until the outcome is clear
	Eastern Central Bank (Benghazi) ¹⁵⁹	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Making deals with Russian firms • Receiving printed money from Russian government • Need to survive in a HoR and Haftar controlled environment that was ripe for Islamist control 	• Limited	• Limited	• Looking to preserve their own position and future
	National Oil Company ¹⁶⁰	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Making deals with UAE • Making deals with Russian Companies • Oil Crescent controlled by Haftar and HoR • Need to outlast any political swings 	• Large monetary resourcing, and able to draw resources from two significant countries	• Limited	• Will maintain relations with both HoR and GNA in order to survive, and will continue to look for interested investors to increase output and revenue

Humanitarian Needs

Libya is in great need of humanitarian relief. The UN assesses that 1.3 million Libyans across the country, 300,000 in the Sirte region, and 50,000 in the city of Sirte are impacted by food and water shortages, lack of access to lifesaving medical care, and the threat of armed groups and Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) (see Appendix H and I).^{161 162 163} In 2016 inflation in Libya reached 25%, and due to a thriving black-market, food prices rose 31%.¹⁶⁴ The UN plan of action released in November 2016 listed over \$150 million in aid requirements, to be executed by twenty-two aid organizations.¹⁶⁵

When comparing the UN assessments of the Sirte region in July 2016 (see Appendix H) and November 2016 (see Appendix I) we see that there is improving humanitarian access to the region since the fall of ISIS. However, security concerns posed by both armed groups and ERW impact relief operations.

The impact on the population caused by the ERW threat cannot be overstated. Qaddafi's regime procured over \$22 billion in weapons through the 1970s.¹⁶⁶ This allowed vast stockpiling of weapons, nearly all of which were unguarded and uncontrolled in the days following the revolution. According to one account, over 100,000 landmines went missing from just one bunker in 2011.¹⁶⁷ Although reports indicate the clearance of over 500,000 explosive devices thus-far casualties due to ERW remain a threat.¹⁶⁸ In 2015 the ICRC reported 2555 ERW related casualties, while in 2016 the ICRC reported 1610 casualties.^{169 170} This threat directly impacts the security of the populace, as well as the ability of aid workers to gain access to areas like Sirte.

The threat posed by ERW in conjunction with armed groups caused the UN and USAID to move their operations out of Libya, now conducting all operations from Tunisia. Hence, they are unable to verify their aid deliveries first-hand, forced to work through third parties from Tunisia to facilitate the delivery of aid.¹⁷¹ Direct communication with US SOF personnel revealed that they saw no evidence of aid delivered to the city of Sirte during a recent six-month period.¹⁷² This raises the common concern that although these efforts are well intentioned, they may not be as effective as the aid organizations would like to believe.

The prospects of jobs, income, and the opportunity to rebuild the oil industry are not likely to help the humanitarian crisis in Sirte. Libyan oil production increased through 2017, now at nearly 900,000 barrels per day.¹⁷³ This is certainly good news for those on the government payroll as oil production had decreased through both 2015 and 2016. However, unless the people and tribes of Sirte reconcile with the rest of Libya and reintegrate into society, they will not benefit.

Sirte and Stability: Recommendations

Indications from the stakeholder's analysis lead to a conclusion that although Sirte is a difficult and complex environment, there is still opportunity to achieve stability and order. If a concerted attempt is not made though, Sirte is at great risk for becoming a festering hotbed of jihadi activity for years to come.

Currently the environment in Sirte is one of little hope. With no prospect of inclusion in Libyan governance, and no ability to defend themselves from either the east or the west, the people of this destroyed city suffer from food insecurity, unclean water and nearly no medical care. The inhabitants of Sirte have little hope of a job in the coming years regardless of the potential oil revenue from the nearby Oil Crescent.

Although targeted humanitarian aid can address many of these near-term issues, aid requires access to be effective.

Recommendation 1: Gain access to Sirte

Effective humanitarian aid requires verifiable, consistent access to Sirte.

USAFRICOM should coordinate through UNSMIL to begin a demining mission, clearing Sirte and the roads leading to it of ERW. This will allow aid organizations to gain the access they need in order to deliver the care that is required. Further, the people of Sirte will recognize that the world cares about what happens to them, and provide the foothold needed for other recommended activities. Aid organizations will require other security measures as well.

UNSMIL and USAFRICOM should begin the necessary negotiations with the GNA to emplace security checkpoints and aid escorts, ideally created from existing police officers trained by NATO allies. This will: bolster the credibility of the GNA; address the security concerns of the aid workers; legitimize the security services loyal to the GNA.

Recommendation 2: Establish a Humanitarian Aid Coordination Mechanism Supporting the GNA

It is clear through the stakeholder's analysis that there is little coordinated effort across the UN, EU, or NATO allies. Further, the GNA holds an ever-weakening position, and is in need of support and legitimacy. Although US military "hard power" action is clearly not required in this case, US military coordination of these many efforts may be greatly beneficial.

Establishing a civil-military operations center (CMOC) in Tripoli, working directly with the GNA would address several issues. First it would have the ability to directly monitor, coordinate and verify aid deliveries. Second, it would legitimize US support for the GNA through demonstrated and visible commitment. Third, it would likely result in a “humanitarian coalition” forming across many of the actors already in country. In turn, this coalition would be the nexus of a coordinated and deliberate effort providing aid where it is needed, and counter negative influences on the people of Sirte as a by-product. If this CMOC idea is welcomed, and successful it could spread to other locations through tribal engagement.

Recommendation 3: Tribal Engagement

Although extremely difficult, and always a long-term endeavor, tribal engagement at senior levels is clearly required to move toward a unity government. This engagement should focus on pulling tribes that are either unable or unwilling to participate in the new Libya toward the GNA. Given the vast number of tribes, focus will be important.

Engaging with the tribes that dominate Sirte, specifically the Qaddafah, will begin to move them closer to the GNA. Additionally, it will promote the idea that the GNA needs to bring them back into the fold as legitimate members of the new Libya. This tribal engagement is key to the notion that Sirte will become a hotbed for jihadists unless they move toward the unity government.

Just as with the Qaddafah, engagement with the Warfallah in order to move them toward the new Libya is key to the future of Libya. The fact that the largest tribe in the country is ostracized simply cannot stand. The nation cannot move forward with a unity government until they have reconciled with the Warfallah.


Similar to these tribes, any tribe that is currently ostracized must eventually be moved toward the new Libya through engagement. Tribal engagement would begin through the CMOC previously mentioned, but likely transition to more senior AFRICOM and State Department leaders in coordination with UNSMIL and GNA leaders meeting to discuss the inclusion of these tribes.

The combined outcome of access to Sirte through security and demining, coordination mechanisms through a CMOC, and tribal engagement is that stability can begin to take hold. The country can begin to reconcile and unify, and the people can begin to feel that they neither have to defend what they have, nor take what they must. Eventually violence and injury will not pervade the Sirte region if US Africa Command begins these steps.


Conclusion

Sirte, Libya is a difficult environment, however there is opportunity to bring stability and order to the region. This will require a small investment of manpower and funding, but will rapidly stabilize Sirte. This will enable the people and tribes of Sirte to move toward the GNA, therefore being included Libya, rather than moving away from the GNA and becoming a jihadist hotbed.


Appendix A: Libyan Tribal and Ethnic Regions¹⁷⁴




Appendix B: Libyan Religious Spectrum¹⁷⁵




Appendix C: Breakdown of Religious Spectrum by Percentage¹⁷⁶




Appendix D: Religious Geographic Breakdown¹⁷⁷




Appendix E: Libyan Oil Infrastructure¹⁷⁸




Appendix F: Map of Libyan Non-State Armed Groups¹⁷⁹




Appendix G: Overlay of Non-State Armed Groups and Oil Infrastructure¹⁸⁰



Appendix H: Libyan Needs Regional Overview¹⁸¹



Appendix I: Libyan Needs Breakdown¹⁸²



Endnotes

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