

Civilian Research Project


Improving Public-Private Collaboration between the DoD and Non-Federal Entities

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Improving Public-Private Collaboration between the DoD and Non-Federal Entities

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Abstract

Public Private Collaborations (PPCs) are voluntary collaborations between the Department of Defense (DoD) and Non-Federal Entities (NFEs) such as Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), academia, industry and other organizations. In 2016, U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) reported significantly more collaborations than U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) and U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM). The difference in the amount of collaborations drives the question of “what explains the difference in strength between PPC programs in SOUTHCOM, AFRICOM and PACOM, given that they all operate in an equal, decentralized environment.” The analysis indicates that SOUTHCOM has strongest program because of its higher level of engagement frequency and selectivity. This is a result of SOUTHCOMs engagement approach, command interest, and strategic communications support. This paper provides recommendations to the strategic level which will increase needed formalization and training. Other recommendations for the theater level will increase program effectiveness without requiring additional resources.

Improving Public-Private Collaboration between the DoD and Non-Federal Entities

As threats evolve in complexity, the United States must use all instruments of national power to achieve its goals. Advantage over an adversary (manmade or natural) might not always result from the application of military force but through fast access to information, infrastructure, and participation in quickly formed partnerships and collaborative networks. Acquiring this advantage requires a whole of government approach, and there are several historical examples of coordinated U.S. Government (USG) effort in response to a crisis.¹ Such cooperation, while not perfect, has advanced significantly and is incorporated in joint doctrine and training.² The topic of Public Private Collaboration, an activity which includes coordination with non-military actors, is less refined than interagency coordination.

Public Private Collaborations (PPCs) are voluntary collaborations between the Department of Defense (DoD) and Non-Federal Entities (NFEs) such as Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), academia, industry, and other organizations. Through collaboration, both parties leverage the expertise and resources of the other to achieve mutually agreed goals without a formal contract or exchange of money.³ According to Ms. Rebecca Morgan, who serves as the project officer for the PPC program in the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy (OSD-P), such collaboration can increase burden sharing, reach people and networks that the DoD would not otherwise reach, employ skills that the DoD does not organically have, and leverage NFEs to complement military effort.⁴ Collaboration which “achieves mutually agreed goals...without a formal exchange of money” is supported by a variety of strategic policy documents.⁵

This mutually beneficial situation appears simple and straightforward. Yet, despite policy that encourages and supports collaboration, operationalizing the effort is difficult. At the strategic level, limited resources, complex legal authorities, lack of incentives, and overall complexity have been consistent challenges to the program.⁶ At the theater level, decentralized execution by combatant commands has resulted in an inconsistent effort across the DoD. The goal of this paper is to advance a general understanding of how this program functions and make recommendations to improve it. Doing so may someday unlock untapped talent and treasure in support of national security aims, at surprisingly low cost.

Theoretically, an effective PPC program can coordinate a collaboration resulting in an exchange of goods, services, information, or human capital which will advance the plans or objectives of the combatant command.⁷ The strength of a program can be measured by the amount of collaborations executed within a one year.⁸

Initial research conducted for this paper indicated that U. S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) reported significantly more collaborations than U. S. Pacific Command (PACOM) and U. S. Africa Command (AFRICOM). Specifically, SOUTHCOM reported 118 collaborations, while AFRICOM and PACOM reported less than 10 during the same period.⁹ Because these organizations are similar in design and function, the difference in the amount of collaborations is puzzling. What explains the difference in strength between PPC programs in SOUTHCOM, AFRICOM and PACOM, given that they all operate in an equal, decentralized environment? This question is the focus of this research.

To establish a foothold within this topic, the author will focus on the strategic and theater level because much of the concept development, legal approval, and authorization takes place in the combatant commands. The author will build a background by reviewing relevant research and documentation, much of it derived from non-military sources which offer interesting parallels to the issue. A historical perspective of the program, including actions taken and ignored will create a path toward a study of current day execution of the PPC program at SOUTHCOM, PACOM, and AFRICOM.

Literature and Policy Review

Academic Literature

In contrast with the topic of USG Interagency coordination, there is not extensive scholastic research regarding collaboration between the DoD and NFEs. To create a useful backdrop for research and analysis, the author reviewed literature from diverse, yet applicable sources. Collaborations with NFEs are unpredictable, transactional, and based on specific circumstances. Therefore, literature related to entrepreneurship and sales is relevant to the activities within a PPC program. The sequence of the review covers organization and management, personnel and training issues, articles which directly address the value of the PPC program, and a review of how the DoD has assessed the PPC program and responded.

A look at program organization between the strategic and theater level is a good starting point. As mentioned in the introduction, the PPC program is executed in a decentralized manner. One person on the Joint Staff J5 and one person in OSD (Policy)

administers the PPC program and the combatant commands execute independently. According to interviews with members of the Joint Staff and OSD, the strategic level does not require feedback from the combatant commands and they are not given specific direction or guidance on how to run their programs.¹⁰ During initial research, several stakeholders recommended creating a central authority for managing the PPC program. Suggestions ranged from creating a new element on the Joint Staff, to simply allowing the situation to remain as it is.¹¹ Since most suggestions were based on practitioner experience and opinion, introducing scholastic work related to this topic can advance the discussion.

The article, “Organizational design correlates of entrepreneurship: The roles of decentralization and formalization for opportunity discovery and realization” by Nicolai Foss, Jacob Lyngsie, and Shaker Zahra informs the decentralization discussion.¹² This article introduces four important concepts. The first is opportunity discovery, which, when linked to the PPC discussion, is simply identifying a potential PPC partner or situation. The second is opportunity realization, which is the ability to convert the potential PPC into an actual collaboration¹³. The third is formalization, which describes the extent that fixed policy and procedure formalize work processes.¹⁴ The fourth concept is decentralization, which the article describes as the discretion that lower-level managers are given for adjusting the tactics they use to pursue opportunities.¹⁵ In terms of PPC, this relates to the level of autonomy the Joint Staff and OSD has given to combatant commands regarding PPC programs.

Foss, Lyngsie and Zahra hypothesize that greater decentralization increases opportunity realization but formalization also increases opportunity realization because it

moderates the disadvantages associated with decentralization¹⁶. All of their hypotheses are supported based on a survey of 474 Danish firms operating in several entrepreneurial industries.¹⁷ Relating this to PPC, decentralized execution by combatant commands is a more effective organizational approach for opportunity discovery and realization. However, an appropriate level of formalization from OSD or the Joint Staff could improve performance across the enterprise.

In terms of talent management, the entrepreneurial elements of PPC require personnel to identify willing civilian participants, develop a degree of trust, communicate the mutual benefits of collaboration, and nurture the relationship through all its phases. Do personnel involved in this task require specific skills? To be more specific, is military experience and the individual personality traits of soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines thrust into this role sufficient for success?

The article “Beyond social capital: the role of entrepreneurs’ social competence in their financial success” by Robert A. Baron and Gideon D. Markman sheds some light onto these questions. The article provides survey data from two separate groups of entrepreneurs (small independent cosmetic retailers and software venture capitalists). The study measured social competence and its linkage with financial success. Its research data shows that people with higher perceived levels of social perception, social adaptability, expressiveness, and impression management are more successful.¹⁸ Since PPC programs have entrepreneurial aspects, it makes sense that personnel working with NFEs should either already have, or acquire these skills.

In addition to reviewing previous research about organizational approaches and talent management, a review of social science articles explains the utility of PPCs at

societal and practical levels. Jim Hake contributed a chapter titled, “A Model for Connecting Civilians and the Military” to the book, *Warriors & Citizens: American Views of Our Military* in which he describes how PPCs can offer a way to connect the military with the citizens it protects.¹⁹ Hake uses the example of an NGO named Spirit of America to illustrate how Special Forces’ units were able to collaborate to get useful, donated goods delivered to the battlefield and given to civilians. Despite the tactical success that this program brought to the battlefield, legal and policy objections from U.S. Central Command severely limited the program.²⁰ Hake describes the irony of the fact that while several USG memorandums and policy documents encourage collaboration, legal and bureaucratic barriers effectively handicapped the program.²¹

Admiral (Ret.) James Stavridis and Evelyn Farkas propose that PPCs advance the military from jointness to a whole of society approach to operations.²² The authors provide numerous examples, ranging from donation of humanitarian assistance materials to collaboration with the Business Executives for National Security (BENS) in their study of illicit drug cartels and subsequent recommendations to the military.²³ The authors point out that the main challenges to fully realizing the potential of PPCs are 1) legal and regulatory restrictions, 2) challenges establishing sufficient trust with potential NFEs, and 3) the lack of proper institutionalization of the PPC program as a whole.²⁴

DoD studies and policy review

The DoD has a positive view of PPC, but tends to use it sporadically.²⁵ On December 11, 2011, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff tasked the Defense Business Board (DBB) “to provide recommendations on how it could more fully exploit the benefits of PPCs”.²⁶ This report is the most recent and comprehensive effort by the DoD

to examine and improve the PPC program.²⁷ The report includes interviews with over 60 current and former governmental and non-governmental leaders and surveys distributed to combatant commands, the military services, and defense agencies, from which there were 48 responses.²⁸ The survey identifies significant observations and findings across the entire enterprise.²⁹ Significant findings related to this research are:

1. Public-Private Collaborations typically occur on an ad-hoc basis.
2. Opportunities for collaboration are missed, weakly pursued, or not exploited.
3. Lessons learned are not captured.
4. Within the individual services, the DBB did not identify high-level organizational frameworks to facilitate Public-Private Collaboration
5. 71 percent of survey respondents reported significant obstacles to PPCs, most often legal obstacles.
6. The absence of supportive doctrine and clear policy at OSD and JCS makes it harder to find authority for collaborations and to overcome a culture of risk aversion.
7. Senior leaders across DoD often do not have access to experts with substantial experience in supporting Public-Private Collaborations.³⁰

DoD Memorandum, “Public Private Partnerships supporting the DoD Mission”, published on 25 April 2013, currently outlines PPC policy.³¹ The memo addresses several topics mentioned by the DBB, inferring that the memo took some of the DBB review findings and recommendations into consideration. For example, the following analysis identifies three key findings of the report, followed by coinciding portions of the 2013 DoD memo and other relevant facts.

First, the DBB report states that “The Department should authorize, encourage and facilitate the use of Public-Private Collaborations throughout the Department at the discretion of the senior leaders of its component commands, services and agencies. Supportive joint doctrine and clear OSD policy guidance should be developed to identify the fundamental value and priorities of partnering with the private sector.”³² The 2013 OSD policy memo states that “individual services should institutionalize the PPC program by developing and promulgating implementation guidance and identifying a single point of contact within each service for coordination of PPCs.”³³ This memo, in effect, left the PPC program up to the individual services. However, interviews with OSD and Joint Staff members indicated that service level implementation guidance has not been published and service points of contact are not identified.³⁴

Secondly, the DBB report states “Participation in Public-Private Collaborations should be: 1) Delegated to 4-star commanders or equivalent, 2) Incorporated into all levels of military training 3) Incorporated into organizational program and budget allocations, 4) Measured to determine levels of success and, 5) Taken into account in personnel evaluations and promotions.”³⁵ The 2013 DoD policy memo does not reference training, exercises, establishing measurements of effectiveness, or personnel evaluation and promotion.³⁶ During an interview with members of OSD and the Joint Staff, Ms. Morgan stated that OSD and the J5 are currently considering options for improving the discussion on PPC, including by possibly starting periodic VTCs with stakeholders and/or disseminating a regularly updated document containing best practices and the rationale for PPC.³⁷

Thirdly, the DBB study states: “Techniques used by the private sector should be implemented to foster, expand, and improve the use of PPC such as annual conferences, online collaboration, networking, and data resources.”³⁸ Since the publication of the report, OSD has conducted networking events via a monthly teleconference with combatant command staff and other stakeholders, but stopped in 2016, pending an update of the policy.³⁹

Finally, the report recommends that a member of the DoD act as the “lead element to help carry out some of the recommendations listed above and to provide continuity and leadership to the enterprise moving forwards.”⁴⁰ The DBB presents four options in this regard. The first is that combatant commands independently administer the PPC programs. The second is that one combatant command should become the executive agent “to develop, incubate and advocate Public-Private Collaboration within DoD.”⁴¹ The third is that the Joint Staff become the lead agency, and the final option is that OSD does so.⁴² The 2013 OSD policy memo directs a hybrid option, designating the Joint Staff J5 as the lead agency for the combatant commands and that all other DoD agencies get their guidance from OSD.⁴³

Methodology

Explanatory Factors, Engagement Frequency and Selectivity


The analysis of the three PPC programs required a standard for comparison. Due to the exploratory nature of this research, an existing model for comparing the three programs was not available. To build a framework for comparison, this paper deconstructs and categorizes the PPC programs into specific explanatory factors and

introduces the concepts of engagement frequency and engagement selectivity. The explanatory factors are based on the practical, staff level actions which compose an actual PPC program. The explanatory factors are 1) engagement approach, 2) command interest and strategic communications, and 3) training and experience. When separated, the factors provide a framework for program comparison.

The explanatory factors combine to influence engagement frequency and engagement selectivity. Engagement frequency is the number of engagements with NFEs for the purpose of creating a collaboration during a fixed period of time. Engagement frequency does not capture actual engagements agreed upon. Engagement selectivity is the degree to which engagement with NFEs is a result of prior planning, or another method of deliberate selection by the combatant command. Engagement frequency and selectivity influences program strength because programs with higher frequency and selectivity of engagements should be more likely to have successful collaborations than a program with fewer, less selective engagements.

While engagement frequency and selectivity do not explain program strengths and weaknesses, they are intervening variables between the explanatory factors and program strength, which is the number of collaborations that are executed in a period of time. Figure 1 illustrates the model.

Public-Private Collaboration Model



Engagement approach, command interest, strategic communications, training, and experience contribute to engagement frequency and selectivity, which influences program strength

Figure 1. Public-Private Collaboration Model⁴⁴

As previously noted, the explanatory factors compose the heart of the three PPC programs and for comparison, are the focus of research. The research consisted of unstructured interviews with key stakeholders at the theater level, the strategic level and the institutional (or generating force) elements of the U.S. Army. At the strategic level, in person and telephonic interviews took place with members of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Policy), the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics), the Joint Staff J-5 Global Policy & Partnerships (Humanitarian Engagement Branch), and the Joint Staff J7 (Training) Interorganizational Coordination Training Division. At the theater level, telephonic and email interviews were conducted with members of the AFRICOM Strategic Engagement Branch (J55) and the PACOM J9. At SOUTHCOM in-person, group, email, and telephonic interviews were conducted with members of the J9.

The interviews were beneficial because they offered a candid assessment of actions taking place within a program that has little standardization, formalized guidance, or scholarly work associated with it. The interviews also helped identify program stakeholders, enabling the author to assess the degree of cross communication, knowledge and experience between combatant commands. Figure 2 illustrates the organizations included in the research.




Figure 2. Organizations included in research and comparison⁴⁵

The limitation of this approach is the small set of personnel interviewed. In many cases, less than 10 personnel administer PPC programs in each combatant command. Additionally, this research did not focus on current operations that may impact the priority of PPC programs. For example, AFRICOM was coordinating combat operations against several extremist organizations, while PACOM and SOUTHCOM were not.

Explanatory Factor Comparison

Engagement approach is the first factor in the comparison. This factor is broad and contains the engagement posture of the program, how the program reconciles the legal aspects of PPCs, and how deals with NFEs seeking business opportunities with

the combatant command. A PPC program has either an active or passive engagement posture. An active engagement posture means that a program is planning and executing external networking events with NFEs with the intention of developing PPCs. A passive engagement posture means that most engagement occurs through existing relationships with NFEs or because new NFEs reach out to the command by their own initiative. During an interview with a panel of SOUTHCOM staff members, they stated that their engagement posture is active, focused on hosting and attending networking events attended by NFEs. CDR Kris Meyer, Chief of the NGO/PVO Engagement Branch stated that he prefers an active posture because NFEs that contact the command on their own often have incorrect assumptions about program processes, scope, and focus.⁴⁶ In contrast, LCDR Charles Chmielak, a branch chief within AFRICOM's Strategic Partnership Division, and Mr. Stephan Frano, a member of the PACOM Strategic Partnership Division stated that both combatant commands utilize a generally passive posture and have not hosted networking events recently. For AFRICOM and PACOM, most contact with NFEs is due to either existing relationships or NFEs reaching out to engage the commands.⁴⁷

As noted by Stavridis and Hake in the literature review, legal barriers can complicate PCCs. Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) and Memorandums of Agreement (MOA) are common tools which provide a legal framework for collaboration. Interviews with staff indicated that AFRICOM requires an MOU or MOA prior to most collaboration.⁴⁸ CDR Meyer stated that SOUTHCOM does not enter written agreements for all collaborations because they believe it adds an unnecessary administrative burden to engagement that would significantly inhibit their effectiveness.⁴⁹

Many NFEs that offer pro bono support to combatant commands also offer commercial services. DoD Contracting and ethics regulations prohibit donations and gifts which would create the appearance of favoritism. Therefore, the way a combatant command handles these organizations is a part of its engagement approach. In AFRICOM, such organizations engage the command through the J59, which is the same staff section that works with the NFE community for pro bono collaboration. As a result, J59 makes the necessary administrative arrangements and legal reviews for the visits, which take place at the AFRICOM headquarters.⁵⁰ In SOUTHCOM, the J9 element engages for-profit organizations only if they are interested in pro-bono activities.⁵¹

The second explanatory factor is command interest and strategic communications. This factor compared program interest by senior leaders and if strategic communication efforts include PPC. These two elements are connected because strategic communications reflect the priorities of the combatant command. The comparison of command interest measured how often senior leaders request feedback from the staff about the PPC program, monitor its activities, or direct certain engagements. The comparison of strategic communications measured the prominence of the PPC program within combatant command websites.

Interviews with PACOM and AFRICOM staff officers indicated that they are not, or rarely, required to provide regular updates outside of routine activity reports.⁵² SOUTHCOM staff officers noted that their commander occasionally directed NFE engagement in specific areas. Also, the commander directed the staff to develop a visual map of the NFE network (termed the white network). This information is intended

to merge with visual representations of U.S. Interagency partners (termed the blue network) and partner nation networks (termed the green network) to create a comprehensive picture of engagement efforts.⁵³

Command websites are a valuable portal for the public to gain an impression about the mission and functions of any combatant command. The SOUTHCOM public website contains a separate page which explains the PPC program, provides access to the unclassified All Partner Access Network (APAN), and directs industry and other organizations seeking to do business to its contracting office.⁵⁴ In contrast, the AFRICOM command website only contains media releases about military-to-military engagements in its Area of Operations (AOR), without mentioning the PPC program.⁵⁵ PACOM does not have a specific website that explains the PPC program, but there is a staff directory listing which leads to a strategic partnering page that states the goals of the program. Unless a prospective NFE knows that the strategic partnering webpage is located within the J9 staff directory, it could be difficult to find information about the program.⁵⁶

The third factor is training and experience. This factor evaluates whether personnel involved in the PPC program were provided skills prior to arrival, if they were trained while at the combatant command, or simply learned the skills on the job. According to interviews, none of the military personnel working the NFE portfolio received special training prior to their arrival.⁵⁷ Interviews with OSD and the Joint Staff validate that there is no DoD training designed specifically for the PPC program.⁵⁸ In AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM, all staff officers receive an overview of the interagency

actors as part of initial training, but there is nothing that discusses how to operate with NFEs.⁵⁹

In SOUTHCOM, one military position that deals with NFE engagement (currently filled by the Navy) requires the officer to be a strategist, meaning the officer must attend a graduate level education program prior to arrival at the unit.⁶⁰ In AFRICOM and PACOM, there is no such educational requirement for similar positions. In terms of civilian personnel, none of the civilian personnel hired to work the PPC portfolio had previous business development or PPC experience. However, some individuals had limited experience working with NFEs prior to employment.⁶¹

Comparative Analysis

Among the explanatory factors, engagement approach has the greatest impact on program strength because engagement posture, formality of relationships, and the choice to combine pro-bono and for-profit engagements into the same staff element significantly affect the frequency and selectivity of engagement. SOUTHCOM's active engagement posture engages NFEs through attending and hosting networking events, which significantly increases engagement frequency. When SOUTHCOM hosts a networking event, they control which NFEs attend, allowing for greater engagement selectivity. This contrasts with the passive approach observed in AFRICOM and PACOM, which do not attend or host networking events.

Regarding legal issues and engaging NFEs with business development interests, SOUTHCOM does not require formal legal relationships for its PPCs, which removes a potential bureaucratic barrier. Also, SOUTHCOM has a clear position that it will only engage with NFEs that are interested in pro-bono collaboration. In contrast, interviews

with AFRICOM staff indicated that in addition to engaging NFEs for pro-bono purposes, the same staff element engages commercially oriented NFEs having no intention to collaborate.⁶² By doing this, personnel in the AFRICOM program have less time to focus on active networking and developing collaborations, which detracts from their engagement frequency and selectivity.

Comparing command interest and strategic communications between the commands also resulted in observable differences. In SOUTHCOM, the command group provides feedback to the PPC program about which NFEs it has an interest in. This feedback gives the SOUTHCOM program an idea of how to align networking efforts to find NFE collaborations which support the intent of the commander. This feedback contributes to its engagement selectivity. PACOM and AFRICOM did not receive this type of feedback so their ability to be selective through application of their commander's intent must rely on other sources such as published orders, campaign plans and other documents. As a result, their engagement selectivity may be affected.

To determine how strategic communication efforts incorporate PPC programs, the research observed combatant command official websites. The observation indicates that SOUTHCOM has incorporated the PPC program into its website that the AFRICOM has not integrated the PPC program, and that PACOM has only slightly integrated PPC. According to SOUTHCOM staff, the website did not generate specific collaborations.⁶³ However, the information contained on the website may increase engagement frequency by educating prospective collaborators about the program and increase selectivity by deferring NFEs with business development goals to the SOUTHCOM contracting office. Additionally, the website fulfills the SOUTHCOM requirement to

ensure fair and equal access to information about the PPC program.⁶⁴ Regardless, if PACOM and AFRICOM do not include PPC into their websites, then they cannot expect an increase in engagement frequency or selectivity.

The factor of training and experience shows the least difference among the commands. Data indicated that military personnel had no specific training for PPC. The same was true for most civilian hires. This factor indicates a common weakness, not strength as the lack of formal training is detracting from the performance of all the combatant commands.

Within all three commands, interviews indicated that military and civilian personnel arrived with equally low levels of experience. However, this does not mean experience is unimportant and will not impact program strength. SOUTHCOM may have generated a degree of momentum and experience through its participation in Operation Unified Response, the 2010 humanitarian relief mission in Haiti. During interviews with SOUTHCOM staff, some staff mentioned that this operation was a “jump start” for their current program, and that they were working to maintain that momentum.⁶⁵

If engagement approach and strategic communications are reasons for program strength, then how much is the DoD investing in these areas? Currently, there is no training for the task, military personnel do not have specific skills which support the program, and the strategic level has not provided formalization which could improve strength in this decentralized execution.

A potential counterargument about formalization could be that SOUTHCOM has a strong program without it, therefore formalization is not necessary. As previously mentioned, SOUTHCOM gained momentum due to Operation UNITED RESPONSE,

which could mean that experience has a greater impact on program strength than formalization. However, Operation United Assistance, the 2014 U.S. Military response to the Ebola epidemic in western Africa was also a major event involving significant humanitarian assistance, but this experience did not leave a lasting mark on the AFRICOM PPC program. This indicates that if momentum and experience can compensate for a lack of formalization, then it is connected to the personnel assigned and may vanish when those individuals depart.

Based on these observations, it appears the inconsistent performance of the PPC program will continue unless additional time and resources are invested into the effort. Current success is the result of individual efforts at combatant command level, not the result of a coherent, formalized program. The absence of standardized training was a weakness observed across all the programs, and the lack of structured methods for spreading best practices between combatant commands indicates that performance will not improve without intervention from the strategic level. Therefore, if DoD expects greater performance, then it will need to increase its investment in people, training, and resources.

Recommendations for the strategic level

Formalization from the strategic level

As discussed, decentralized yet formalized execution of PPC might be the best approach to execution. Within the DoD, similar programs benefit from formalization. One example is the Woman, Peace, and Security (WPS) program. This program is based off the National Action Plan (NAP) for Women Peace and Security which was

signed by into effect by President Obama on December 11, 2011.⁶⁶ OSD (P) and the Joint Staff J5 administer the program, and combatant commands are required to provide data to DoD which supports an annual report.⁶⁷

When compared with the PPC program, the benefits of increased formalization of the WPS program are easy to see. First, a presidential executive order mandates WPS. Conversely, the president briefly mentions PPC in his national security strategy. The DoD has written formal implementation guidance for the WPS program, while a memorandum covers PPC. The WPS program hosts, and participates in monthly VTCs and meetings which exchange information between the combatant commands and strategic stakeholders. Currently, there are no such coordinating events in the PPC program. The author recommends that either OSD, Joint Staff J5 or another element use the WPS program as a needed example for formalizing the PPC program.

Develop appropriate training

An active engagement approach requires networking and other interpersonal skills. The absence of DoD training and special skill requirements for military billets is evidence of little or no investment in this area. Other USG agencies have identified the need to train their people for PPC, and can provide a starting point for the DoD. For example, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) developed the Private Sector Engagement Course. The course describes the USAID PPC program and how it ties into USAID. According to CDR Kris Meyer, who attended the course in Mexico City, Mexico, "SOUTHCOM should continue to send coordinators to this course until a suitable DoD alternative exists."⁶⁸

Sending DoD personnel to the USAID course should not be considered a DoD solution. The purpose of DoD collaborations will not always mirror those of USAIDs or other agencies. The example of the Business Executives for National Security collaboration in SOUTHCOM is a good example, which, due to its subject area could have coordination points with multiple USG entities.

The need to train DoD members on skills required to support an active engagement approach is important. As mentioned by Baron and Markman, people with more social competence and higher perceived levels of social perception, social adaptability, expressiveness, and impression management are more successful in an entrepreneurial environment.⁶⁹ In effect, the current policy expects mid-level military officers to independently adapt their personal communication style, interpret and understand the values of NFEs and understand multiple networking platforms. If officers can do this, it is due to their own personality traits and experiences. In combination with random assignment of officers into PPC billets, only a fraction of officers in PPC billets might gain these skills. The author recommends that DoD develop its own version of the USAID Private Sector Engagement Course, adapted to meet DoD needs.

Identify military occupations that might bring needed skills

The research indicated that military members filling PPC related joint billets have little or no experience with NFEs. The DoD should review which skills within all services would be a good fit for PPC programs. For example, acquisitions officers or some logistics officers may have skills not previously associated as helpful for NFE engagement. Joint billets should be adjusted so that the right talent supports PPC programs.

Recommendations for the Theater Level

Develop a network visualization tool

The research indicated that PPC activities are not frequently briefed to combatant command leaders outside of routine reporting. The SOUTHCOM concept of a white network visualization capability promises to give NFE engagement programs a method of communicating information about their NFE networks with senior leaders that would be “mainstreamed” along with other combatant command functions. The author recommends other commands examine the effectiveness of this and adapt it as appropriate.

Direct all solicitation/contracting to other staff sections

As noted in the research, members of the AFRICOM PPC program are responsible for engagement with NFEs that are not interested in pro-bono collaboration. This results in significant use of staff time and resources, which does not support the PPC program. SOUTHCOM has a staff SOP which directs these engagements to its SOUTHCOM Acquisition Support Center (ASC), resulting in more time and resources to focus on the PPC program. This is a potential best practice for other combatant commands to consider implementing.

Conclusion

Overall, the analysis indicates that SOUTHCOM has the strongest program because of its higher level of engagement frequency and selectivity. The higher engagement frequency and selectivity are the result of its active engagement approach, higher command interest, and strategic communications support. The results of

comparing the PPC programs within three combatant commands using the explanatory factors demonstrates the importance of effective and active outreach, command interest, strategic communications, on the strength of a PPC program. It also illustrates that lack of training is an issue facing all of the compartment commands.

At the theater level, most combatant commands can act upon the recommendations without additional resources. The recommendations for the strategic level may require more assets but will certainly require greater leader interest. Only the strategic level can establish the policies, practices, and procedures necessary for successful PPC programs.

Endnotes

¹ The 2014 US response to the Ebola outbreak in West Africa was such an example. The Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) was designated as lead agency and the Department of Defense was in a supporting role.

² JP 3-08, *Interorganizational Cooperation*, October 12, 2016, is the joint publication that covers this activity. Several other service level publications support this document with more detailed instruction.

³ JP 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, February 15, 2016, does not define Public Private Cooperation This definition comes from a draft OSD Memorandum “Public-Private Partnership and Cooperation Policy” dated 28 November 2016.

⁴ Interview panel discussion with Ms. Rebecca Morgan, Foreign Policy Advisor, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Policy); GS-15 Marshall Mantiply, Joint Staff/J5 Global Policy and Partnerships, Chief Humanitarian Engagement Branch; Mr. Schaeffer Dearmond (CTR), Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (AT & L), interview by author, Pentagon, Washington, DC, 27 January 2017.

⁵ In the 2015 *National Security Strategy*, President Obama stated that “We must also demonstrate our ability to forge diverse partnerships across our political spectrum” and “many achievements of recent years were made possible by...the public and private sectors working together”. In DoD Instruction 3000.05 “Stability Operations”, the military is instructed to “Collaborate with other U.S. Government agencies and with foreign governments and security

forces, international governmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and private sector firms as appropriate to plan, prepare for, and conduct stability operations. Barak Obama, *National Security Strategy* (Washington, DC: The White House, (February, 2015), 3; Department of Defense, *Stability Operations*, Department of Defense Instruction 3000.05 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Defense, September 16, 2009), 2.

⁶ Interview panel discussion with Ms. Rebecca Morgan, Foreign Policy Advisor, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Policy); GS-15 Marshall Mantiplay Joint Staff /J5 Global Policy and Partnerships, Chief Humanitarian Engagement Branch; Mr. Schaeffer Dearmond (CTR), Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (AT & L), interview by author, Pentagon, Washington, DC, 27 January 2017.

⁷ General examples include “gift-in-kind” donations of materiel goods, volunteer interpreter support, and pro-bono support from academia, industry or trade organizations.

⁸ There is not a formalized PPC “program” within the DoD. The term “program” is used to define the overall effort to create PPCs at a combatant command.

⁹ All three combatant commands stated that although their staff sections were responsible for overall engagement with NFEs, it was possible the service components were coordinating directly with NFEs on their own, and therefore not tracked by them. CDR Kristopher Meyer, US Navy, NGO/PVO Engagement Branch; SOUTHCOM J9; interview by author, SOUTHCOM HQ Miami, FL, 02 February, 2017; Mr. Stephan Frano, Strategic Partnership Division, PACOM Pacific Outreach Directorate. Telephone interview with author, 22 February, 2017; LCDR Charles Chmielak, Strategic Partnership Division, AFRICOM Plans and Policy Directorate, telephone interview followed up with emails, 2 February 2017:

¹⁰ Interview panel discussion with Ms. Rebecca Morgan, Foreign Policy Advisor, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Policy); GS-15 Marshall Mantiplay, Joint Staff /J5 Global Policy and Partnerships, Chief Humanitarian Engagement Branch; Mr. Schaeffer Dearmond (CTR), Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (AT & L), interview by author, Pentagon, Washington, DC, 27 January 2017.

¹¹ Defense Business Board, *Report to the SECDEF: Public- Private Collaboration in the Department of Defense* FY 12-04. (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Defense, FY 12-04), 2.

¹² Nicolai J Foss, Jacob Lyngsie, and Shaker A Zahra. “Organizational design correlates of entrepreneurship: The roles of decentralization and formalization for opportunity discovery and realization,” *Strategic Organization* 13, no. 1, (December 2014): 33.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 37.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 37.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 36.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 37.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 55.

¹⁸ Robert A. Baron, and Gideon D. Markman. "Beyond Social Capital: The Role of Entrepreneurs' Social Competence in Their Financial Success," *Journal of Business Venturing* 18, no. 1 (2003): 41.

¹⁹ Jim Hake, "A Model for Connecting Civilians and the Military," in *Warriors and Citizens: American Views of Our Military*, Kori Schake and Jim Mattis (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2016), 265-286.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 268.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 276.

²² James Stavridis and Evilin Farkas, "The 21st Century Force Multiplier: Public-Private Collaboration," *The Washington Quarterly* 2, (2012): 8.

²³ *Ibid.*, 8.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ Interview panel discussion with Ms. Rebecca Morgan, Foreign Policy Advisor, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Policy); GS-15 Marshall Mantiply Joint Staff /J5 Global Policy and Partnerships, Chief Humanitarian Engagement Branch; Mr. Schaeffer Dearmond (CTR), Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (AT & L), interview by author, Pentagon, Washington, DC, 27 January 2017.

²⁶ Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Leveraging Public-Private Collaboration to Augment the Department of Defense's Mission- Study Terms of Reference," memorandum for Chairman, Defense Business Board, Washington, DC, December 12, 2011.

²⁷ Interview panel discussion with CDR Kristopher Meyer, US Navy, NGO/PVO Engagement Branch; SOUTHCOM J9; GS-15 Jorge Silveria, Deputy Director SOUTHCOM J9; GS-15 Nivia Butler, Chief, Public-Private Coordination Division, SOUTHCOM J9; GS-13 Paul Murray, Private Sector Engagement Branch; interview by author, SOUTHCOM HQ Miami, FL, 02 February, 2017

²⁸ Defense Business Board, *Report to the SECDEF: Public- Private Collaboration in the Department of Defense" FY 12-04*. (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Defense, FY 12-04), 2.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 1.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 2.

³¹ Department of Defense, *Public Private Partnerships Supporting the DoD Mission*, Department of Defense Memorandum (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Defense, April 25, 2013), 2.

³² Defense Business Board, *Report to the SECDEF: Public- Private Collaboration in the Department of Defense" FY 12-04*. (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Defense, FY 12-04), Slide 21 of document addendum.

³³ Department of Defense, *Public Private Partnerships Supporting the DoD Mission*, 2.

³⁴ Interview panel discussion with Ms. Rebecca Morgan, Foreign Policy Advisor, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Policy); GS-15 Marshall Mantiply Joint Staff /J5 Global Policy and Partnerships, Chief Humanitarian Engagement Branch; Mr. Schaeffer Dearmond (CTR), Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (AT & L), interview by author, Pentagon, Washington, DC, 27 January 2017.

³⁵ Defense Business Board, *Report to the SECDEF* Slide 21 of document addendum

³⁶ Department of Defense, *Public Private Partnerships Supporting the DoD Mission*, 2.

³⁷ Interview panel discussion with Ms. Rebecca Morgan, Foreign Policy Advisor, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Policy); GS-15 Marshall Mantiply Joint Staff /J5 Global Policy and Partnerships, Chief Humanitarian Engagement Branch; Mr. Schaeffer Dearmond (CTR), Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (AT & L), interview by author, Pentagon, Washington, DC, 27 January 2017.

³⁸ Defense Business Board, *Report to the SECDEF* Slide 21 of document addendum

³⁹ Interview panel discussion with Ms. Rebecca Morgan, Foreign Policy Advisor, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Policy); GS-15 Marshall Mantiply Joint Staff /J5 Global Policy and Partnerships, Chief Humanitarian Engagement Branch; Mr. Schaeffer Dearmond (CTR), Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (AT & L), interview by author, Pentagon, Washington, DC, 27 January 2017.

⁴⁰ Defense Business Board, *Report to the SECDEF* Slide 21 of document addendum.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Defense Business Board, *Report to the SECDEF* Slide 21 of document addendum

⁴³ Department of Defense, *Public Private Partnerships Supporting the DoD Mission*, 1

⁴⁴ Model and graphic developed by author.

⁴⁵ Illustration by Author.

⁴⁶ Interview panel discussion with CDR Kristopher Meyer, US Navy, NGO/PVO Engagement Branch; SOUTHCOM J9; GS-15 Jorge Silveria, Deputy Director SOUTHCOM J9; GS-15 Nivia Butler, Chief, Public-Private Coordination Division, SOUTHCOM J9; GS-13 Paul Murray, Private Sector Engagement Branch; interview by author, SOUTHCOM HQ Miami, FL, 02 February, 2017.

⁴⁷ Information from separate interviews with Mr. Stephan Frano, Strategic Partnership Division, PACOM Pacific Outreach Directorate. Telephone interview with author, 22 February, 2017; LCDR Charles Chmielak, Strategic Partnership Division, AFRICOM Plans and Policy Directorate, telephone interview followed up with emails, 2 February 2017.

⁴⁸ LCDR Charles Chmielak, Strategic Partnership Division, AFRICOM Plans and Policy Directorate, telephone interview followed up with emails, 2 February 2017.

⁴⁹ CDR Kristopher Meyer, US Navy, NGO/PVO Engagement Branch; SOUTHCOM J9, interview by author, SOUTHCOM HQ Miami, FL, 02 February, 2017.

⁵⁰ LCDR Charles Chmielak, Strategic Partnership Division, AFRICOM Plans and Policy Directorate, telephone interview followed up with emails, 2 February 2017.

⁵¹ CDR Kristopher Meyer, US Navy, NGO/PVO Engagement Branch; SOUTHCOM J9, interview by author, SOUTHCOM HQ Miami, FL, 02 February, 2017.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Interview panel discussion with CDR Kristopher Meyer, US Navy, NGO/PVO Engagement Branch; SOUTHCOM J9; GS-15 Jorge Silveria, Deputy Director SOUTHCOM J9; GS-15 Nivia Butler, Chief, Public-Private Coordination Division, SOUTHCOM J9; GS-13 Paul Murray, Private Sector Engagement Branch; interview by author, SOUTHCOM HQ Miami, FL, 02 February, 2017.

⁵⁴ SOUTHCOM Public/Private Cooperation Website, <http://www.southcom.mil/Work-With-Us/Public-Private-Cooperation/> (accessed February 28, 2017).

⁵⁵ AFRICOM Website, <http://www.africom.mil/news/partnerships> (accessed February 28, 2017).

⁵⁶ PACOM Strategic Partnership Website. <http://www.pacom.mil/Contact/Directory/J9/Strategic-Partnerships/> (accessed February 28, 2017)

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Interview panel discussion with Ms. Rebecca Morgan, Foreign Policy Advisor, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Policy); GS-15 Marshall Mantiply Joint Staff /J5 Global Policy and Partnerships, Chief Humanitarian Engagement Branch, interview by author, Pentagon, Washington, DC, 27 January 2017

⁵⁹ In AFRICOM all new staff officers are required to attend “the AFRICOM newcomers’ course” and the “AFRICOM Staff Officers Course” which provides, among other things an overview of interagency integration. SOUTHCOM offers a similar course.

⁶⁰ CDR Kristopher Meyer, US Navy, NGO/PVO Engagement Branch; SOUTHCOM J9, interview by author, SOUTHCOM HQ Miami, FL, 02 February, 2017.

⁶¹ Information from separate interviews with CDR Kristopher Meyer, US Navy, NGO/PVO Engagement Branch; SOUTHCOM J9, interview by author, SOUTHCOM HQ Miami, FL, 02 February, 2017; Mr. Stephan Frano, Strategic Partnership Division, PACOM Pacific Outreach Directorate. Telephone interview with author, 22 February, 2017; LCDR Charles Chmielak, Strategic Partnership Division, AFRICOM Plans and Policy Directorate, telephone interview followed up with emails, 2 February 2017.

⁶² LCDR Charles Chmielak, Strategic Partnership Division, AFRICOM Plans and Policy Directorate, telephone interview followed up with emails, 2 February 2017.

⁶³ CDR Kristopher Meyer, US Navy, NGO/PVO Engagement Branch; SOUTHCOM J9, interview by author, SOUTHCOM HQ Miami, FL, 02 February, 2017.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Interview panel discussion with CDR Kristopher Meyer, US Navy, NGO/PVO Engagement Branch; SOUTHCOM J9; GS-15 Jorge Silveria, Deputy Director SOUTHCOM J9; GS-15 Nivia Butler, Chief, Public-Private Coordination Division, SOUTHCOM J9; GS-13 Paul Murray, Private Sector Engagement Branch; interview by author, SOUTHCOM HQ Miami, FL, 02 February, 2017.

⁶⁶ White House, Office of the Press Secretary <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/12/19/executive-order-instituting-national-action-plan-women-peace-and-security> (accessed March 17, 2017)

⁶⁷ CDR Elaine A. Collins, Joint Chiefs of Staff, J5, Global Policy and Partnerships, telephone interview by author, March 22, 2017

⁶⁸ CDR Kristopher Meyer, US Navy, NGO/PVO Engagement Branch; SOUTHCOM J9, interview by author, SOUTHCOM HQ Miami, FL, 02 February, 2017.

⁶⁹ Baron and Markman. "Beyond Social Capital: The Role of Entrepreneurs' Social Competence in Their Financial Success," 41.