USAWC CIVILIAN RESEARCH PROJECT

**Counterterrorism Partners for the Future: Indicators of Effective Partner Relationships**

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"Foreign partners are essential to the success of our CT efforts; these states are often themselves the target of and on the front lines in countering terrorist threats.  The United States will continue to rely on and leverage the capabilities of its foreign partners even as it looks to contribute to their capacity and bolster their will.  To achieve our objectives, partners must demonstrate the willingness and ability to operate independently, augmenting and complementing U.S. CT efforts with their unique insights and capabilities in their countries and regions.  Building strong enduring partnerships based on shared understandings of the threat and common objectives is essential to every one of our overarching CT objectives. Assisting partners to improve and expand governance in select instances is also critical, including strengthening the rule of law so that suspected terrorists can be brought to justice within a respected and transparent system.  Success will depend on our ability to work with partners bilaterally, through efforts to achieve greater regional integration, and through multilateral and international institutions."[1]

National Strategy for Counterterrorism

Building security partnerships is outlined as one of the principles which guide our counterterrorism efforts in the National Strategy for Counterterrorism.  This document states that the United States must join with key partners and allies to share the burdens of common security.  It further states that in some cases partnerships are in places and with countries which do not share U.S values or our vision of regional and global security.  It is, however, in our interest to build CT cooperation with such partners to push them in a direction that advances CT objectives.[2]  The recently published Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) states that the DoD will rebalance its counterterrorist efforts with a greater emphasis on building partner capacity as well as building new and innovative partnerships to continue the counterterrorism fight.[3]  It further outlines, however, that the implications of sequestration and decreased funding will require even more tailored and selective partnerships.[4]  In a period of reduced funding and declining Army force structure, it is imperative that we continue to analyze our current partner relationships to determine their effectiveness in the counterterrorism fight and identify partner nation indicators which contribute to building security capacity.  These indicators can then be applied to the selection of future partners in other regional commands.

The National and Department of Defense (DoD) strategic guidance emphasize the need to leverage the capabilities of allies and partners around the world to bolster their defense

self-sufficiency.[5]  This defense self-sufficiency and the indicators that a partner has the ability to grow its security capabilities is the essence of this research.  This paper will examine our current military counterterrorism partnerships and strategic engagement on the African continent and specifically the nations of the Trans Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and The Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT).   A recent RAND study concluded the Army must consider new ways to focus its security cooperation programs and activities to build the most appropriate and effective capabilities in partner armies.[6] This paper will analyze current multi-lateral partnerships in Africa and determine observable indicators and dimensions of their effectiveness as a basis for partner relationships in the future.   This analysis will look at governance indicators, capability and interest indicators, and economic indicators to identify the strongest candidate countries for each variable.  It will then combine the governance and capability indicators to further refine the list of nations which currently possess the best aspects of governance and capability.  Finally, the research will combine all the factors to determine the top nations for building partner capacity using these variables.  The nations with the highest indicators can then be compared against the Department of State Country Reports on Terrorism to determine if the factors for building partner capacity correlate with the State Department analysis.

**Do we have the right partners for the future Counterterrorist fight?**

Our National Security Strategy and National Strategy for Counterterrorism both advocate building up partner capabilities and influencing partner nations to take up the fight against terrorism in order to deny safe-havens and expand security within their nations.  The strategies state that we may have partnerships with countries with whom we have very little in common except for the desire to defeat al-Qa'ida and deny safe-haven to its affiliates.  They further observe that these partners may not share our values or even our broader vision of regional and global security. The strategy concludes that it is still in our interest to continue CT cooperation

with such partners in order to advance CT objectives.[7]  The strategy, however, also outlines that the United States partners best with nations that share our common values, have similar democratic institutions, and bring a long history of collaboration in pursuit of our shared security.[8] So the questions from our National Strategies are: what nations should we be partnered with and how do we know if those partnerships will increase capacity to assist our future counterterrorism efforts?

As Magnus Nordenman points out in his work, *The End of the War on Terror and the Future of U.S. Counterterrorism,* "with the drawdown in Afghanistan, the main effort in US counterterrorism is shifting to Africa and the many weakly governed spaces there that are thought of as potential basing areas for extremist groups hostile to the United States and its interests."[9]  It is in these countries that the United States is working to build greater capacities in security and governance through a number of bilateral and multi-lateral agreements, including the Trans Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership and The Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism.  At the recent annual conference of TSCTP in October 2013, the Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of African Affairs stated, "It is in the United States' interest to build enduring, institutional partnerships with Africa, built on mutual understanding and respect for the rule of law, human rights, and democratic values. This work is not flashy and it is not quick. It is not done in a single program or a single fiscal year. But it is these partnerships that will ultimately advance our shared interests and security over the long term."[10]

The recently written QDR outlines many of the objectives and programs for the DoD as it prepares to rebalance the force while continuing to project power around the globe.  "The demand for U.S. forces to expand the counterterrorism capabilities of allied or partner forces will likely increase in the coming years.  The United States will continue to advise, train, and equip partner forces to perform essential tasks against terrorist networks.  Operations and activities in the Maghreb, Sahel and Horn of Africa further our national security interests."[11]  As we look to

begin or strengthen existing partnerships throughout Africa and assist nations threatened by terrorism as well as defend our own national security, we must be selective in our partnerships and the resources we expend, and identify those partners that have the greatest opportunity to build capacity for the future.

**What are historically successful aspects of a good partner for building security capacity?**

Building the defense capacity of our allies and partners to ensure access for contingency operations, strengthen relationships, and increase security have long been objectives of our national strategy.   Although foreign policy imperatives, or the nature or location of a threat, will at times dictate our force priorities when choosing partner nations, when there is flexibility in partners and priorities, choosing partners that were willing to invest their own funds to support or sustain capacity; that have sufficient absorptive capacity; that have high governance indicators; have strong and healthy economies; and whose broad strategic interests predominantly align with U.S. interests in their region have been the most successful.[12] These indicators that have shown historical success will be a basis for the analysis of our current partnerships and specifically the TSCTP and PREACT initiatives.

**Partnership in Africa**

The United States Department of Defense in concert with the Department of State executes a number of partnership and anti-terrorism initiatives throughout Africa.  Many of these programs assist African nations on countering violent extremism and counterterrorism finance. The focus, however for this paper is on military partnerships and their effectiveness.  Following the events of September 11th and the beginning of the War on Terror, the United States began to foster cooperation with partners in Africa to combat terrorism.  Initiated in 2003, the East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative began as a U. S. effort to strengthen the military capabilities and foster greater cooperation of partners in combating terrorism.  Priority capacities for this

initiative included conducting military training for border control and coastal security,

strengthening control of the movement of people and goods across borders, combating terrorist

financing, training police, and instituting education programs to prevent extremist fundamentalist

influences.[13]  Additionally, the Pan Saharan Initiative (PSI) was started to help countries in the

Sahel region of northern Africa to improve border security and enhance counterterrorism

capabilities. The intent of the program was to enhance the ability of U.S. partners in Africa to

deny use of their territory to terrorist groups.[14] The PSI was further expanded to what is now the

Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership.  As outlined in the Senate hearing on African

affairs,

> "TSCTP is a multiyear, multi-agency commitment designed to support partner efforts in the Sahel and the Maghreb to constrain and ultimately eliminate the ability of terrorist organizations to exploit the region. The program supports partner efforts to build long-term capacity to defeat terrorist organizations and facilitation networks, disrupt efforts to recruit, train, and provision terrorists and extremists, counter efforts to establish safe havens for terrorist organizations, disrupt foreign fighter networks that may attempt to operate outside the region, address underlying causes of radicalization, and increase the capacity of moderate leaders to positively influence vulnerable populations. It also supports efforts to increase regional and sub-regional cooperation and interoperability."[15]

This partnership operates in ten partner countries—Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Burkina

Faso and Niger in the Sahel region; Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia in the Maghreb region; and

Nigeria and Senegal in the sub-Saharan region."[16]  An additional military initiative known as The

Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT) was established in 2009.

PREACT is the East Africa counterpart to the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership and

was developed to build the counterterrorism capacity in East African nations.  PREACT member

countries include Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia,

South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda.[17]

**Building Partner Capacity for Counterterrorism in Africa:**

Current counterterrorism programs in Africa have been developed to ensure that local and foreign security services, diplomatic efforts, and humanitarian and development capacities are effectively employed to combat both terrorist actors and the political, social, and economic conditions that enable them to operate and build support.[18] The focus of these partnerships within the DoD is the military cooperation activities with the partner nations to build their security capacity. As outlined in the Senate Hearing on African Affairs,

"The DOD through primarily U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) is supporting an overarching U.S. strategy to counter terrorism—specifically al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)—in the Sahel and North Africa. The principal tool for doing so is the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) which seeks to build the capacity of regional militaries so that they can counter the presence of AQIM and prevent their operations within their countries. The strategy for a long-term solution is that each nation is capable of controlling its territory because it has the support of it citizens while maintaining   capacity to ensure stability."[19]

These partnership and capacity building activities span the spectrum from outreach programs to training events, as well as joint/combined exercises. The principal objective of DOD military cooperation activities is to work with our partner militaries in Africa to foster stability, build capacity, and reduce threats. These goals are achieved by promoting defense institutional reform, developing professional militaries, and building or strengthening African security capacities.[20] These efforts aim to increase host nations' military professionalism and access to interoperable equipment in order to enhance their direct-action capacity against terrorists.[21]

**Analysis of TSCTP and PREACT nations**

The twenty nations of the TSCTP and PREACT initiatives are continually evaluated and compared through the World Bank to track all aspects of their development and governance in order to determine the amount of funding they will receive through a number of international aid organizations. These development indicators in conjunction with State Department country reports on counterterrorism provide a basis to identify many of the characteristics required for

effective capacity building.  As the RAND study on building partner capacity concluded, "If BPC

is consistently funded and delivered, supported and sustained, well matched to partner

capabilities and interest and shared with a partner that supports the effort and is healthy

economically and in terms of governance; prospects for effective BPC are very good." (National

Defense –Rand 89) In determining the factors to be evaluated, statistics from the World Bank

were used for each nation.  These indicators included annual growth in Gross Domestic Product

(GDP), percentage of GDP used for military expenditures, and military expenditures as part of

government expenses.  These factors all help to determine the support of the partner nation and

the health of their economy.  Additional indicators which assist in evaluating the partner nation's

capabilities and interest in their security sector can be measured by an analysis of annual arms

imports. Governance indicators are found in analyzing the World Bank rankings for all aspects

of a nation's government effectiveness, Rule of Law, and the ability of the nation to control

corruption.   These factors both independently and collectively analyzed can provide a basis for

determining the nations which have the greatest ability to build partner capacity.  Once the

nations are determined through the statistical analysis, they can be compared to the State

Department's Country Reports on Terrorism to determine if the statistics and ratings correspond

to building partner capacity with respect to counterterrorism.

In order to properly align World Bank statistical data with the proponents of effective

capacity building, the definitions under which the information was collected must be understood.

World Bank and African Development Indicator statistical information definitions accessed in

this analysis are the following:[22]  (World Bank) (African Development Indicators)

> GDP:  the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products.
>
> Growth in GDP:  Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency.
>
> Military Expenditure  as a percentage of GDP:   Military expenditures data which includes all current and capital expenditures on the armed forces, including

peacekeeping forces; defense ministries and other government agencies engaged in defense projects; paramilitary forces, if these are judged to be trained and equipped for military operations; and military space activities.

Military Expenditure as a percentage of Government Expenditure: Military expenditures data which includes all current and capital expenditures on the armed forces as a percentage of government spending.

Arms Imports: Arms transfers cover the supply of military weapons through sales, aid, gifts, and those made through manufacturing licenses. Data cover major conventional weapons such as aircraft, armored vehicles, artillery, radar systems, missiles, and ships designed for military use. Excluded are transfers of other military equipment such as small arms and light weapons, trucks, small artillery, ammunition, support equipment, technology transfers, and other services.

Government Effectiveness: This measures the quality of public services, the quality and degree of independence from political pressures of the civil service, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies.

Rule of law: measures the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.

Control of Corruption: measures the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests.

Table 1 below provides the consolidated data for each TSCTP and PREACT country for each variable. These variables will be further broken down and analyzed categorically under the proponents of building partner capacity which include governance, economy, and the nation's capability and interest to increase their security.

| Country Name | GDP (billions) | GDP growth (annual %) | Military expenditure (% of GDP) | Military expenditure (% of central government expenditure) | Arms imports (millions) | Government Effectiveness | Rule of Law | Control Corruption |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **TSCTP Nations** | | | | | | | | |
| Algeria | 119.7 | 2.6 | 4.3 | 14.6 | 1085 | -0.6 | -0.7 | -0.5 |
| Burkina Faso | 7.4 | 4.2 | 1.3 | 10.5 | 15 | -0.7 | -0.3 | -0.4 |
| Chad | 8.4 | 0.082 | 2 | | 10 | -1.5 | -1.5 | -1.4 |
| Mali | 7.2 | 2.7 | 1.5 | | | -0.8 | -0.4 | -0.7 |
| Mauritania | 2.9 | 4 | | | 5 | -0.9 | -0.8 | -0.7 |
| Morocco | 79.8 | 5.7 | 3.4 | 10.2 | 1405 | -0.1 | -0.2 | -0.2 |
| Niger | 4.5 | 2.3 | | | | -0.8 | -0.6 | -0.7 |
| Nigeria | 169.8 | 6.8 | 0.97 | | 63 | -1.2 | -1.2 | -1.1 |
| Senegal | 10.6 | 2.1 | | | 16 | -0.4 | -0.3 | -0.5 |
| Tunisia | 39.3 | -2 | 1.3 | 4.1 | 7 | 0.4 | 0.2 | 0 |
| | | | | | | | | |
| **PREACT Nations** | | | | | | | | |
| Burundi | 1.5 | 4.2 | | | | -1.1 | -1.2 | -1.1 |
| Comoros | 0.4 | 2.2 | | | | -1.8 | -1.1 | -0.8 |
| Djibouti | | 2.22 | | | | -0.9 | -0.6 | -0.3 |
| Ethiopia | 21.4 | 7.3 | 1.1 | 10.3 | 76 | -0.4 | -0.8 | -0.7 |
| Kenya | 24.5 | 4.4 | 1.9 | 8.4 | 14 | -0.7 | -1.1 | -1.1 |
| Rwanda | 4.1 | 8.2 | 1.2 | | | -0.2 | -0.5 | 0.1 |
| Seychelles | 1.2 | 8 | 0.81 | 3.1 | 8 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.3 |
| Somalia | | | | | | -2.3 | -2.5 | -1.7 |
| Sudan | 34.6 | -3.3 | | | 145 | -1.3 | -1.3 | -1.2 |
| Tanzania | 21 | 6.4 | 1.1 | | 69 | -0.4 | -0.4 | -0.4 |
| Uganda | 14.2 | 6.6 | 3.7 | 19.7 | 270 | -0.6 | -0.4 | -0.9 |

**Table 1 – World Bank Statistics and African Development Indicators for TSCTP and PREACT nations. (The rating scale for Govt Effectiveness, Rule of Law and Control Corruption ranges from –2.5 (weak performance) to 2.5 (very high performance)).**

The strongest correlation for building partner capacity was found to be within strong governance indicators and where nations invest their own funds to maintain capability or conduct training.   It was also found that economic indicators, although important, only have a moderate effect on the effectiveness of BPC.[23] This analysis therefore will look at the indicators independently to identify the strongest candidate countries for each variable. Governance and capability indicators will then be combined to further refine the nations which currently possess the best aspects of governance and capability.  Finally, all the factors will be combined to determine the top nations for building partner capacity using these variables.  The results will then be compared with the State Department Country Reports on Terrorism to determine if these World Bank and developmental indicators can assist the DoD in determining the best partners when the desire is to build partner capacity.

| Country Name | Government Effectiveness | Rule of Law | Control Corruption | Average Overall Governance |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **TSCTP Nations** | | | | |
| Algeria | -0.6 | -0.7 | -0.5 | -0.6 |
| Burkina Faso | -0.7 | -0.3 | -0.4 | -0.5 |
| Chad | -1.5 | -1.5 | -1.4 | -1.5 |
| Mali | -0.8 | -0.4 | -0.7 | -0.5 |
| Mauritania | -0.9 | -0.8 | -0.7 | -0.8 |
| Morocco | -0.1 | -0.2 | -0.2 | -0.2 |
| Niger | -0.8 | -0.6 | -0.7 | -0.7 |
| Nigeria | -1.2 | -1.2 | -1.1 | -1.2 |
| Senegal | -0.4 | -0.3 | -0.5 | -0.4 |
| Tunisia | 0.4 | 0.2 | 0 | 0.2 |
| | | | | |
| **PREACT Nations** | | | | |
| Burundi | -1.1 | -1.2 | -1.1 | -1.1 |
| Comoros | -1.8 | -1.1 | -0.8 | -1.2 |
| Djibouti | -0.9 | -0.6 | -0.3 | -0.6 |
| Ethiopia | -0.4 | -0.8 | -0.7 | -0.6 |
| Kenya | -0.7 | -1.1 | -1.1 | -0.9 |
| Rwanda | -0.2 | -0.5 | 0.1 | -0.3 |
| Seychelles | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0.2 |
| Somalia | -2.3 | -2.5 | -1.7 | -2.1 |
| Sudan | -1.3 | -1.3 | -1.2 | -1.2 |
| Tanzania | -0.4 | -0.4 | -0.4 | -0.4 |
| Uganda | -0.6 | -0.4 | -0.9 | -0.6 |

Table 2 – Governance Indicators

Using the African Development Indicators of 2011, the top seven nations as far as overall governance in both the TSCTP and PREACT were the nations of Burkina Faso, Morrocco, Senegal, Tunisia, Rwanda, Seychelles and Tanzania. They had the highest average governance scores when combining the government effectiveness, rule of law and corruption control data. The nations with the lowest overall governance were Somalia and Chad. These governance indicators are imperative to the overall selection of partners to the DoD and the nation because they are clear indications of not only the ability of the government to use the support and training provided, but also indicate the nations have a means in place through the rule of law and corruption control to lawfully prosecute terrorist threats.

The second aspect analyzed for each of the nations is the capability and interest the nation's possess to not only take on building capacity, but also provide capital to increase their own security. This analysis is best determined by examining the percentage of GDP spent on defense, the percentage of money that is spent on the military as a fraction of total governement

expenditures and the annual arms imports. These factors provide a basis for understanding how much a nation is providing for its own security without additional support and how much the nation is attempting to build its military infrastructure through the procurement of additional military arms. Table 3 highlights the expeditures of the TSCTP and PREACT nations on their military. The information absent in the World Bank indicators is due to the host nation not providing the information to the World Bank in accordance with their own disclosure procedures and security purposes.

| Country Name | Military expenditure (% of GDP) | Military expenditure (% of central government expenditure) | Arms imports (millions) |
|---|---|---|---|
| **TSCTP Nations** | | | |
| Algeria | 4.3 | 14.6 | 1085 |
| Burkina Faso | 1.3 | 10.5 | 15 |
| Chad | 2 | | 10 |
| Mali | 1.5 | | |
| Mauritania | | | 5 |
| Morocco | 3.4 | 10.2 | 1405 |
| Niger | | | |
| Nigeria | 0.97 | | 63 |
| Senegal | | | 16 |
| Tunisia | 1.3 | 4.1 | 7 |
| | | | |
| **PREACT Nations** | | | |
| Burundi | | | |
| Comoros | | | |
| Djibouti | | | |
| Ethiopia | 1.1 | 10.3 | 76 |
| Kenya | 1.9 | 8.4 | 14 |
| Rwanda | 1.2 | | |
| Seychelles | 0.81 | 3.1 | 8 |
| Somalia | | | |
| Sudan | | | 145 |
| Tanzania | 1.1 | | 69 |
| Uganda | 3.7 | 19.7 | 270 |

Table 3 – Military Capability and Interest Expedenitures

In analyzing these variables, the top seven nations for each category were identified and compared against the other two variables to determine the top overall nations for capability and

interest. This was made easier by the fact that some nations do not provide all the data for each variable within this category. Although the nations of Sudan, Tanzania and Nigeria had some of the largest arms imports, the lack of additional data which supported government expenditure or military expenditure as a percentage of GDP eliminated them from overall consideration.[1] The nations which clearly had a percentage of GDP and government expenditure as well as arms imports to support their security and military development were Algeria, Burkina Faso, Morroco, Tunisia, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda.

The combination of these two variables (governance and capability) begins to further refine the list of nations that possess at least two of the attributes for effectively building partner capacity. Table 4 below combines these two variables.

| Country Name | Military expenditure (% of GDP) | Military expenditure (% of central government expenditure) | Arms imports (millions) | Average Governance |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| TSCTP Nations | | | | |
| Algeria | 4.3 | 14.6 | 1085 | -0.6 |
| Burkina Faso | 1.3 | 10.5 | 15 | -0.5 |
| Chad | 2 | | 10 | -1.5 |
| Mali | 1.5 | | | -0.5 |
| Mauritania | | | 5 | -0.8 |
| Morocco | 3.4 | 10.2 | 1405 | -0.2 |
| Niger | | | | -0.7 |
| Nigeria | 0.97 | | 63 | -1.2 |
| Senegal | | | 16 | -0.4 |
| Tunisia | 1.3 | 4.1 | 7 | 0.2 |
| | | | | |
| PREACT Nations | | | | |
| Burundi | | | | -1.1 |
| Comoros | | | | -1.2 |
| Djibouti | | | | -0.6 |
| Ethiopia | 1.1 | 10.3 | 76 | -0.6 |
| Kenya | 1.9 | 8.4 | 14 | -0.9 |
| Rwanda | 1.2 | | | -0.3 |
| Seychelles | 0.81 | 3.1 | 8 | 0.2 |
| Somalia | | | | -2.1 |
| Sudan | | | 145 | -1.2 |
| Tanzania | 1.1 | | 69 | -0.4 |
| Uganda | 3.7 | 19.7 | 270 | -0.6 |

Table 4 – Capability and Interest Combined with Governance Indicators

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[1] The problem with missing data on the government military expenditure is that the lack of reporting to the World Bank and this analysis may eliminate possible nations which potentially have high interest in increasing security and their capabilities.

In analyzing Table 4, nations like Morocco are clearly one of the top nations of PREACT and TSCTP according to the indicators.  The nations of Algeria, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, and Uganda have high elements of capability and interest, but only moderate governance ratings while Tunisia and Seychelles have the highest governance ratings but moderate capability and interest levels.

| Country Name | GDP (billions) | GDP growth (annual %) |
|---|---|---|
| **TSCTP Nations** | | |
| Algeria | 119.7 | 2.6 |
| Burkina Faso | 7.4 | 4.2 |
| Chad | 8.4 | 0.082 |
| Mali | 7.2 | 2.7 |
| Mauritania | 2.9 | 4 |
| Morocco | 79.8 | 5.7 |
| Niger | 4.5 | 2.3 |
| Nigeria | 169.8 | 6.8 |
| Senegal | 10.6 | 2.1 |
| Tunisia | 39.3 | -2 |
| | | |
| **PREACT Nations** | | |
| Burundi | 1.5 | 4.2 |
| Comoros | 0.4 | 2.2 |
| Djibouti | | 2.22 |
| Ethiopia | 21.4 | 7.3 |
| Kenya | 24.5 | 4.4 |
| Rwanda | 4.1 | 8.2 |
| Seychelles | 1.2 | 8 |
| Somalia | | |
| Sudan | 34.6 | -3.3 |
| Tanzania | 21 | 6.4 |
| Uganda | 14.2 | 6.6 |

Table 5 – Economic Indicators

The analysis of the economic indicators revealed that Nigeria was the only country which had one of the highest GDPs and percentage growth of GDP.  A number of countries had either high growth rates or had one of the highest GDPs, but did not have both.  The nations which had the highest GDP were Algeria, Morocco, Nigeria, Tunisia, Kenya and Sudan.  The nations of Sudan and Tunisia, however, had negative growth rates for GDP.   The nations which had the highest percentage growth in GDP were Seychelles, Rwanda, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Tanzania and Uganda.

Once each variable was analyzed independently, all the factors which promote building partner capacity can be combined to determine those nations which have the greater likelihood of success during partnerships.

| Country Name | GDP (billions) | GDP growth (annual %) | Military expenditure (% of GDP) | Military expenditure (% of central government expenditure) | Arms imports (millions) | Government Effectiveness | Rule of Law | Control Corruption | Average Governance |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **TSCTP Nations** | | | | | | | | | |
| Algeria | 119.7 | 2.6 | 4.3 | 14.6 | 1085 | -0.6 | -0.7 | -0.5 | -0.6 |
| Burkina Faso | 7.4 | 4.2 | 1.3 | 10.5 | 15 | -0.7 | -0.3 | -0.4 | -0.5 |
| Chad | 8.4 | 0.082 | 2 | | 10 | -1.5 | -1.5 | -1.4 | -1.5 |
| Mali | 7.2 | 2.7 | 1.5 | | | -0.8 | -0.4 | -0.7 | -0.5 |
| Mauritania | 2.9 | 4 | | | 5 | -0.9 | -0.8 | -0.7 | -0.8 |
| Morocco | 79.8 | 5.7 | 3.4 | 10.2 | 1405 | -0.1 | -0.2 | -0.2 | -0.2 |
| Niger | 4.5 | 2.3 | | | | -0.8 | -0.6 | -0.7 | -0.7 |
| Nigeria | 169.8 | 6.8 | 0.97 | | 63 | -1.2 | -1.2 | -1.1 | -1.2 |
| Senegal | 10.6 | 2.1 | | | 16 | -0.4 | -0.3 | -0.5 | -0.4 |
| Tunisia | 39.3 | -2 | 1.3 | 4.1 | 7 | 0.4 | 0.2 | 0 | 0.2 |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| **PREACT Nations** | | | | | | | | | |
| Burundi | 1.5 | 4.2 | | | | -1.1 | -1.2 | -1.1 | -1.1 |
| Comoros | 0.4 | 2.2 | | | | -1.8 | -1.1 | -0.8 | -1.2 |
| Djibouti | | 2.22 | | | | -0.9 | -0.6 | -0.3 | -0.6 |
| Ethiopia | 21.4 | 7.3 | 1.1 | 10.3 | 76 | -0.4 | -0.8 | -0.7 | -0.6 |
| Kenya | 24.5 | 4.4 | 1.9 | 8.4 | 14 | -0.7 | -1.1 | -1.1 | -0.9 |
| Rwanda | 4.1 | 8.2 | 1.2 | | | -0.2 | -0.5 | 0.1 | -0.3 |
| Seychelles | 1.2 | 8 | 0.81 | 3.1 | 8 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0.2 |
| Somalia | | | | | | -2.3 | -2.5 | -1.7 | -2.1 |
| Sudan | 34.6 | -3.3 | | | 145 | -1.3 | -1.3 | -1.2 | -1.2 |
| Tanzania | 21 | 6.4 | 1.1 | | 69 | -0.4 | -0.4 | -0.4 | -0.4 |
| Uganda | 14.2 | 6.6 | 3.7 | 19.7 | 270 | -0.6 | -0.4 | -0.9 | -0.6 |

Combining all the indicators and highlighting the nations which had the highest results compared to the other nations of the partnerships produce a list of nations which clearly are performing better than others for all factors. Although no one nation was shown to be in the top for all categories, many such as Morocco, Burkina Faso, Tunisia, Seychelles, Rwanda and Tanzania were rated among the best in two of the partner capacity indicators. Important to this factor is each one of these nations ranked higher than other nations in overall governance which includes rule of law, government effectiveness, and corruption control. The nations of Nigeria and Uganda, although relatively strong in the factors of economics and capability, lack the relative governance ratings and would therefore require greater analysis for possible partnership.

**Other Indicators**

This work has focused efforts on empirical data to outline the aspects of successful partnerships, but other indicators including the social and political stability, as well as the threat environment of a nation directly affect the success of building partner capacity as well. All three of these additional indicators can be analyzed by insuring our building partner capacity goals and efforts are in synch with what the potential partner needs and has the ability to grow in capability. "The prospects of effective capacity building increases dramatically when objectives align with specific partner interests."[24] This focus on shared interests aligns objectives against the threat environment, while adhering to the social and political atmosphere of the nation.

**State Department Country Reports on Counterterrorism.**

The United States Department of State writes an annual report to document the progress countries throughout the world have made toward improving their counterterrorism efforts as well as their inclusion in regional counterterrorism programs. The State Department Counterterrorism report is one way to test the development indicators and conclusions from the World Bank data analysis. If the indicators of governance, capacity, interest, and economic health used during this analysis are correct, then nations like Morocco and Burkina Faso should show greater progress in counterterrorism programs and security than the nation of Somalia due to their high governance ratings, investment in their military, and economic security.

**Morocco, Burkina Faso and Somalia Country Reports**

The analysis of TSCTP and PREACT nations against development indicators showed that Morocco and Burkina Faso were two of the strongest nations for governance and factors which support building partner capacity while the nation of Somalia was the worst. The State Department Counterterrorism report supports this analysis in its conclusions as well in its ratings of overall government performance, legislation, security forces, programs, and regional cooperation. The report stated, "Morocco's counterterrorism efforts are comprehensive. The

Moroccan government continued its broad counterterrorism strategy of vigilant security measures, regional and international cooperation, and counter-radicalization policies."[25]  It further emphasized Morocco's ability to capture and prosecute terrorists while emphasizing adherence to human-rights standards and the increased transparency of law enforcement procedures.  Morocco has maintained cooperative relationships with regional partners by sharing information, conducting joint operations, and participating in military, security, and civilian capacity-building events. These partnerships and Morocco's initiative to modernize its security force have enhanced border security and improved capabilities to counter illicit traffic and terrorism.[26] The report on Morocco provides credence to the analysis of the developmental indicators and the importance of high governance indicators in counterterrorism operations.

Burkina Faso, although not as strong as Morocco, continues to improve its counterterrorism programs and security forces.  The report states, "The Government of Burkina continues to stress regional cooperation as an imperative to combat and defeat terrorism."[27] The Burkina Faso government still has limited counterterrorism capabilities, but the government and its security forces continue to improve through their participation in regional counterterrorism conferences and training opportunities.  The Burkinabe government continues to invest in increasing the capabilities of its forces through substantial training support in counterterrorism, intelligence, and border security issues. This training and improved equipment purchases for forces helped to increase armed patrols in the capital and along the border in response to the crisis in Mali.

The country of Somalia suffers from a lack of governance and government procedures to conduct counterterrorism operations.  Neither the TFG nor the newly-established Government of Somalia has effective control over some parts of the country outside Mogadishu. These un-governed areas currently under al-Shabaab control provided a permissive environment to train operatives, including foreign fighters, and plot attacks.  The report reiterates, "The ability of

Somali federal, local, and regional authorities to prevent and preempt al-Shabaab terrorist attacks remained limited. International terrorists remained in Somalia and continued to mount operations within Somalia and in neighboring countries."[28] The lack of governance in the country inhibits counterterrorism operations as well as efforts to quell terrorist financing. Somalia has no laws that criminalize terrorist financing, does not possess a formal banking sector, and does not have a system for freezing terrorist assets. This report correlates to the statistical analysis and ratings for governance from the World Bank.

**Partnerships with Failed States**

The analysis of this research is an attempt to provide indicators to our DoD leadership as they begin or maintain partnerships and build partner capacity in the future. The United States and the DoD, however, will at times have partnerships with nations which do not have good governance or rule of law, as those partnerships may assist in efforts to gain access or execute short-term missions. These partnerships, however, should not be characterized as building capacity. "The assistance provided to indigenous security forces in a failed state in the past has shown minimal results in the long term. Many of these failed governments have employed armed force which has been involved with criminal activities or has members that have perpetrated, or are perpetrating, atrocities and violence against civilians."[29] In these instances, U.S. assistance and training almost certainly will be exploited by warlords to further their own narrow agendas. They will also be exploited by individual militia members for personal aggrandizement. In either case, the impact of such assistance in the best case is likely to be minimal, and in the worst case may actually make the problem of finding and apprehending terrorist groups more difficult."[30] It is for this reason that the DoD must analyze their partners and be thorough in its assessments of the type of partnership into which it is entering and what the desired outcomes from that partnership will be. Not all partnerships will build capacity of a

nation's security or increase its counterterrorism efforts, especially if the nation is a failed state or lacks indicators of governance.

**Relevance**

The relevance of this work is the continued emphasis on partnerships and building partner capability for the future. The need for partnerships around the world and the ability of partner nations to not only secure their own borders, but take actions against terrorist threats are prominent aspects of the National Security Strategy and the National Strategy for Counterterrorism. "The United States has recognized that combating terrorism will not be accomplished effectively by any single government working alone. Rather, it requires cooperation from like-minded countries around the world. The United States continues to invest in building strong partnerships to confront shared security threats as well as to help build the capacity of its allies to take independent action at their national, sub-regional, and regional levels."[31] As we face the threats of the future and in a time of limited resources, the United States must insure the partnerships it fosters and nations it assists will provide the security and counterterrorism practices our national security requires.

**Recommendations**

"While current African and U.S. counterterrorism efforts appear to have disrupted terrorists' abilities to launch further catastrophic attacks in Africa since 2002, there has been no absence of terrorist activity in the region. However, U.S. counterterrorism efforts have not prevented the expansion of territorial control and influence by al Qaeda-associated movements in Africa or decreased ideological support for extremism on the continent. In addition, efforts to build the counterterrorism capacities of African governments through partnership and training have had limited success."[32]

As the United States continues efforts in Africa and looks to pivot attention on the Pacific region, it must enter into partnerships with an understanding of the outcomes it wants to

achieve.  The dwindling budget and decrease in the number of forces available to conduct partnerships warrants thorough analysis of the partner nation and its ability to build capacity.

Recommendations for future partnerships which are attempting to build partner capacity in counterterrorism include focusing resource efforts to those nations which have the most likelihood to achieve increased levels of capability against terrorists.  These nations should have high governance indicators and have high anti-corruption indicators to insure assistance is being used to build capacity.  Nations selected for partnership should be evaluated on their ability to grow and sustain security capabilities as well as their proximity to the terrorist threat.  This evaluation would focus on the military structure, its support from the government and the ability for the military personnel to learn and grow in leadership, planning and execution of their duties.  The United States should refrain, if possible, from attempting to build partner capacity in failed states.  Although building proxy forces in failed states may achieve short term goals and missions, building long term capacity and security requires a level of governance, rule of law, and anti-corruption from the government.  The United States should invest in more bi-lateral agreements where the U.S. can control the level and sustainability of support to the partner nation.   The increase in bi-lateral agreements will insure the limited resources of the economy and our military can be focused on particular nations which show the greatest progress in counterterrorism and building capacity.

Our national security and military will always depend on partnerships to ensure access for contingency operations, strengthen relationships and increase security around the world.  As the DoD faces a time of diminishing resources in both capital and manpower, it must conduct greater analysis and use development indicators to determine which nations the DoD will have, as the QDR states, tailored and selective partnerships.

Endnotes

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